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PRESENTATION
This is the fourth year that the weekly dispatches transmitted 
during a year, by ECLAC Washington to ECLAC Santiago and other 
regional offices, are gathered in a single document.1
For their presentation here, the dispatches are classified by 
subject and ordered chronologically within each chapter. The 
heading of each chapter indicates the saliency, during the year of 
certain issues of the international economic agenda. For instance, 
measured by the number of dispatches transmitted, more prominently 
appear the evolution of the world economy, as well as Inter- 
American economic relations, followed by trade and the functioning 
of the multilateral financial institutions. While more distantly 
behind come other issues such as the U.S. economy and the tension 
with Japan.
By contrast with 1989 when the agenda was dominated by "high 
politics," in the terms of Richard Lawrence from The Journal of 
Commerce. 1990 was "a lively year for trade policy."
For instance, the Uruguay Round negotiations entered the final 
stretch, in full suspense, with their outcome still uncertain by 
the end of the year.
In the Western Hemisphere, agreement was reached about 
beginning negotiations between Canada, Mexico and the United States 
for the creation of a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 
Additionally, President Bush set the Inter-American economic agenda 
by proposing, as part of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
(EAI), the creation of a free trade area "from Anchorage to Tierra 
del Fuego."
Finally, as a result of the so-called Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII) Talks held throughout the year, the trade
1 ECLAC, International Economic Highlights 1987 (LC/WAS/L.2) 
17 August 1988; International Economic Highlights 
1988 (LC/WAS/L.4) 17 March 1989; International 
Economic Highlights 1989 (LC/WAS/L.8) 15 March 1990.
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imbalance between Japan and the United States failed, for the time 
being, to become the relationship of major tension of the present 
international economic system.
Similarly, the events in Eastern Europe, that by the end of 
1989 threatened to become a major factor of instability, were 
absorbed by the world economy, without major disruption. A united 
Germany led the way, by year’s end, enjoying what the Bundesbank 
President Karl Otto Poehl characterized as a "strong boom," 
accompanied by "— touch wood— reasonable price performance."
However, during the second half of 1990, from elsewhere 
appeared two major spoilers of this relatively optimistic outlook. 
First, at the peak of the summer, the tension in the Persian Gulf 
led to an immediate doubling of oil prices, disrupting trade 
accounts and fueling inflation. Second, of more significance was 
the contribution this disruption made to deepening the already 
sluggish behavior of the U.S. economy, raising the specter of a 
long recession in the leading economy. By the end of the year, 
there was consensus that the U.S. economy was in recession, the 
question was for how long.
Some of these and other issues were covered in the dispatches 
transmitted throughout the year. The purpose of gathering them in 
a single document is to make them available for easier 
consultation, in case the Washington D.C. vantage point they 
present still has some testimonial value.
To conclude, unfamiliar readers should be reminded that each 
dispatch tries to remain within the self-imposed limit of 750 
words, because their purpose is only to bring and issue to the 
readers' attention, leaving open the decision if it demands or not 
further consideration.
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I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
I. 1. WHITHER EUROPE? (WDW/6/90 - 21 FEBRUARY 1990)
Not so long ago, not even a year ago, the future of Europe 
seemed comfortably centered around the deepening of the European 
Community (EC), through "the completion of the internal market by 
1992." The events in Eastern Europe have radically redefined the 
terms of this debate, to the point that now all of Europe's future 
seems to be at stake, on account of the incessant succession of 
vertiginous transformations that have been taking place in what 
used to be known as the Socialist camp.
The best evidence of present perplexities can be found in the 
hollowness that have acquired some of the recent statements made in 
preparation for the attainment of the legislative program contained 
in the EC's Commission 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal 
Market. endorsed by the EC Summit of the same year.
For instance, in the most ambitious research project launched 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of attaining a single market in 
1992, better known as the Cecchini Report, the issues are viewed in 
rather simple terms, as "the removal of non-tariff barriers," such 
as border controls and customs red tape; divergent standards and 
technical regulations; as well as conflicting business laws and 
protectionist procurement practices.
In the preface of the Cecchini report's summary, published in 
1988, the President of the Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, declared 
that the members of the European Community "needed a common 
objective which could raise their sights above daily routine 
problems and thereby concentrate their energies."
Furthermore, the size of the "costs of non-Europe" and 
consequently the potential gains were evaluated in 200 billion 1985 
ECUs, which in terms of additional growth was estimated to 
represent "between four and seven percentage points of the 
Community's domestic product."
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From abroad, beyond the immediate, sometimes almost paranoid, 
reaction couched in very general terms as the fear of a "fortress 
Europe," the issues were viewed also in specific and simple terms. 
As recently as in November 1989, a task force from the private 
sector Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations 
(ACTPN), of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), issued 
a report on Europe 1992.
In the view of the ACTPN, "the issues raised by the single 
market program are therefore on the cutting edge of international 
trade policy, and their resolution will require the pursuit of 
innovative solutions in both bilateral and multilateral arenas." 
Accordingly, six issues were identified as those "in which the U.S. 
has a substantial interest in helping shape the direction of 
change." These issues were: discriminatory rules of origin;
protectionist public procurement; drafting and recognition of 
standards and certification; local content requirements in 
technology transfers; and national treatment and reciprocity.
Even in the Annual Economic Report for 1989/90, issued by the 
EC Commission, on November 1989, the "two major challenges" for the 
European Community are described as "to strengthen further the 
determinants of growth, and to improve convergence toward 
stability."
Similarly, the last special summit of West European leaders, 
held on November 18, only ten days after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, was called to deal specifically with the changes that are 
taking place in Poland and Hungary. In that occasion, admittedly, 
the issue of German unification was not discussed because, as an 
unidentified participant declared, "nobody brought it up."
Since then, German unification has swiftly moved to the 
forefront of the European agenda, making the "simple" issues raised 
by the completion of the internal market in 1992 pale in 
comparison.
Just ten days after the special EC summit of November 18, 
Chancellor Kohl unveiled a 10 point plan for the unification of 
Germany. Also, in stark contrast with West Germany's traditional 
resistance to deliberate steps that might force the pace of 
economic policy coordination and monetary unification, to the 
Bundesbank's dismay, Chancellor Kohl announced a plan for the 
monetary union of East and West Germany.
This prospect by itself, given the D-mark's pivotal position 
within the European Monetary System (EMS), was enough to generate 
an immediate reaction among the other Community members.
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Nonetheless, on top of these events, last week came the so- 
called "two plus four" agreement, between the two Germanies and the 
four victorious allies, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and 
the United States. As a result, the two Germanies will begin talks 
about the internal aspects of unification, soon after the East 
German elections of March 18. Later, the external aspects of German 
unification will be discussed with the other four occupying powers 
under whose responsibility German security still remains.
President Delors, of the European Commission, immediately
declared that the swiftness of German unification created "unease 
as well as possibilities" for the European Community. Consequently, 
last Friday, another special summit of West European leaders was 
announced, for April in Dublin, this time to deal specifically and 
exclusively with the Community's response to German unification.
Among the issues singled out as critical are the consequences 
of German monetary unification for the EMS; for the completion of 
the internal market in 1992; and finally, if East Germany will have 
access to the subsidies that the Community's regional policy makes 
available to least developed regions.
The events in Eastern Europe have radically altered the
European agenda because the unification of Germany not only lies at
the core of the creation of the European Community, it has also
been the central issue of European diplomacy for more than a 
century. The future of the European Community has been overtaken by 
"high politics."
I. 2. THE IMF'S WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WDW/13/90 - 16 MAY 1990)
Immediately before last week's Spring meetings, the staff of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released advanced copies of 
this year's first issue of its bi-annual World Economic Outlook 
XWEOJl, to be published in full by the end of this month.
The advanced copy contains the following chapters; recent 
developments in the world economy, with projections for 1990 and 
1991 in both developed and developing countries; a medium-term 
baseline scenario for the industrial countries, with alternative 
scenarios that examine two basic issues: the consequences of a 
concerted program to achieve price stability and the impact of 
prospective cuts in defense spending, particularly in the United 
States; selected policy issues in industrial countries, such as 
price stability, fiscal consolidation, current account imbalances, 
as well as the prospects of European economic integration and of 
individual countries; a medium-term baseline scenario for the
6
developing countries; finally, indicative of the times, the 
economic reforms in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
World economic activity slowed in 1989 to about 3 percent, 
from 4 percent in 1988. The slowdown is expected to persist in 
1990, with the growth in output moderating further, at 2 1/4
percent, while in 1991 a moderate pick-up is projected at 3%. This 
is mainly the result of the restrictive monetary policies 
implemented in most industrial countries. This restrictive policy 
stance is expected to persist while inflation remains a main 
concern and while monetary policy continues bearing the major 
burden, without receiving much support from fiscal policy, 
particularly in those countries that exhibit high budget deficits.
In the developing countries, growth of real GDP fell in 1989 
to 3 percent, from 4 percent in 1988. It will remain unchanged in 
1990 and reach 4 1/2 percent in 1991. Besides the implementation of 
stabilization policies, three factors emanating from the 
unfavorable international environment are singled out as 
responsible: slower growth in world trade, the firming of
international interest rates, and the weakening of primary 
commodity prices.
The immediate prospects of the world economy will be 
"significantly influenced by a number of major developments," 
mainly derived from the domain of high politics. First, the 
scheduled completion of a single European Community market in 1992 
is expected to boost investment and output. Second, the impact of 
the adoption and implementation of fundamental economic reforms in 
Eastern Europe will involve significant transitional costs, by 
weakening economic activity and employment in the short-run, but 
will improve significantly the economic performance of these 
economies in the medium-term. Third, the consequences of German 
unification, with its anticipated increases in government spending, 
pressure on prices and higher interest rates.
As a result of the slowdown in economic activity and weakening 
of investment, the volume of world trade will experience further 
reductions, to 6 1/2 percent in 1990 and 5 3/4 percent in 1991, 
which contrasts with the expansion of 7 1/4 percent and 9 percent 
experienced in 1989 and 1988, respectively. Some recent progress 
is recognized in the reduction of current account imbalances among 
the major industrial economies, with the surplus in Japan and the 
deficit in the United States declining substantially, while 
Germany's surplus continued increasing. Nonetheless, if German 
unification leads to increases in domestic demand and investment, 
the surplus in Germany is bound to "diminish considerably."
In most of the heavily indebted developing countries, the 
situation "remains extremely difficult." Even so, "strong domestic 
adjustment measures" are still "the key to achieving sustained 
growth and balance of payments viability over the medium term."
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However, the Brady initiative's emphasis on "a degree of debt 
service reduction" is recognized as necessary, "to increase the 
incentives for adjustment and investment and to improve business 
confidence." Although it is considered "disappointing" that the 
progress of negotiations has been "slow," signaling the risk that 
the debtor countries may experience "substantial delay in the 
restoration of growth."
In the medium term, the following requirements for the 
achievement of higher growth in the indebted countries are 
identified: first, that markets remain open in the industrial
countries; two, that world interest rates experience a lasting 
decline, because of a sufficient supply in world saving; and three, 
that the flow of financial resources to developing countries is not 
reduced to increase official financial assistance to Eastern 
Europe.
Finally, medium-term projections for 1992-1995, as well as 
alternative scenarios are presented for both developed and 
developing countries.
Under the customary assumption of "unchanged policies," as 
well as of constant real exchange rates and unchanged oil prices in 
real terms, GNP growth in the industrial countries is expected to 
average above 3 percent throughout the period, with inflation 
declining to around 3 1/4 percent by 1995.
One alternative scenario describes the possible consequences 
of "a concerted program to achieve price stability in the 
industrial countries," or aiming at zero inflation, over a period 
of six to eight years. Although the long-run benefits of achieving 
and maintaining price stability are "likely to be substantial," 
these benefits should be weighed against the cost of bringing down 
inflation. On this point, the analysis concludes that "the costs of 
disinflation are temporary and that they can vary substantially 
depending on the degree of wage/price flexibility and on the 
credibility of the monetary authorities' commitment to achieve its 
obj ective."
The other alternative scenario analyzes the possible impact of 
prospective cuts in defense spending in the industrial economies in 
general, as well as for the fiscal position of the United States in 
particular. The conclusion is that "the macroeconomic implications 
of defense cuts are small," with significant regional and sectoral 
effects, particularly in defense-related industries, such as 
primary metals, aircraft, and electronic equipment, which are 
expected to suffer relatively large losses in output and 
employment. Still, these "shocks" would be temporary and "should be 
absorbed by the industrial economies without major disruptions."
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Perhaps too conscious of the staleness exhibited by the 
outlook, the press summary released with the WEO proposed the 
following most revealing headline: "IMF sees slower economic
growth, but no recession." Leonard Silk, in The New York Times, 
coined a new term, "slugflation," to describe this state of 
combined "sluggish growth with sluggishly rising prices."
I. 3. WHITHER EASTERN EUROPE? (WDW/15/90 - 30 MAY 1990)
The importance of the inquiry about the economic prospects of 
Eastern Europe has been recently emphasized by the attention it has 
received in two rather different quarters. First, in a rare glimpse 
of its "post-cold war" analytical capabilities, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) has made public a report, prepared at 
the request of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 
titled Eastern Europe: Lona Road Ahead to Economic Well-Being.
Second, the last issue of the World Economic Outlook (WDW/13/90), 
prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), 
contains a chapter dedicated to the analysis of the economic 
reforms, as well as a supplementary note on the recent economic 
developments, in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. It is interesting 
to contrast some of the differences and similarities that appear in 
both of these timely analyses of this relevant issue.
Although phrased somewhat differently, there seems to be 
agreement about the explanation of what went wrong with the 
previous economic performance of these economies.
For the CIA, "the legacy" confronted by the new governments is 
characterized by "slow or stagnant growth, declining productivity, 
energy-intensive and obsolete heavy industries, heavy foreign 
debts, poor quality goods and noncompetitive exports, massive 
environmental problems and deteriorating infrastructures, to name 
a few."
For the IMF, the relatively successful performance of the 
earlier postwar years in these economies, manifested in rates of 
growth comparable to those of the industrialized market economies, 
can be explained by "large increases in labor and capital inputs 
and readily available natural resources." This pattern of growth, 
characterized as "extensive," became unsustainable in the 1980s as 
"a result of declines in the growth of labor input as the sectoral 
migration from agriculture to industry càme to a standstill," as 
well as because of domestic pressures for improved standards of 
living that "led to reductions in investment."
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The IMF recognizes that these economies were relatively 
successful in the "high degree of job security and aspects of 
social policy, such as the provision of universal health care, 
basic schooling and literacy." Because of this recognition it finds 
all the more surprising the relatively poor performance of these 
economies "in areas where equity considerations are important or 
where markets may fail to reflect the full costs of benefits to 
society." For instance, the environmental record is judged to be 
"poor." Also, the pattern of resource allocation is "far from 
optimal and does not respond flexibly to changes in the relative 
scarcity of factors of production," as revealed by the energy 
intensity of productive patterns after the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
Finally, the mix of goods and services produced "is not consistent 
with the preferences of the population."
There seems to be broad agreement among both institutions 
about what is required by the economic reform of these economies.
For the CIA, it is necessary to decentralize management; to 
change performance indicators, from total output and sales to 
profits; to free prices; to expand the private sector; to increase 
financial discipline; to encourage competition; to liberalize 
restrictions on foreign investment; to establish contract law; and 
to enhance individual incentives.
For the IMF, "the main features of reform" are indicated by 
the fact that "the information contained in market prices is 
ignored or suppressed; there is an absence of competition and 
competitive markets; and the incentives faced by enterprises, 
workers, and consumers do not encourage efficiency and motivation."
On the basis of these premises, a "comprehensive reform 
strategy" entails, first, that "the system of microeconomic 
management of the economy would need to be replaced with a system 
of macroeconomic management and control operating through fiscal 
and monetary policies." This means primarily that "the government 
budget would have to be brought into broad balance and the growth 
of money and credit controlled." Second, the intermediation role of 
financial markets should be more fully developed. Third, to reduce 
the size of the public sector by privatizing "many, if not most, 
public enterprises." Fourth, "governments will have to take on new 
responsibilities and create new institutions," such as changes in 
the legal system and commercial codes, as well as the establishment 
of "a social safety net of unemployment benefits and a system of 
income transfers to the poorest members of society," to allow for 
enterprise autonomy over the hiring and firing of labor. Finally, 
it is "particularly important to end the institutional monopoly 
over foreign trade."
Having specified the requirements of reform, both institutions 
focus on the more complex issue of the transition.
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The CIA sees "formidable obstacles ahead," in the form of 
"four major threats:" 1) a deep economic recession; 2) a fragile 
financial position, on account of heavy debt burdens and poor 
prospects of increasing export revenues; 3) inexperienced 
governments; and 4) the struggle over privatization, over how to 
distribute the wealth accumulated by the state. In conclusion, "the 
public's tolerance for prolonged austerity will be key to the 
success of the reforms," with the prospect of unemployment, more 
than price rises and the fall of real wages, as the critical 
concern. The CIA is optimistic about the "ultimate outcome," 
although it recognizes that in the short-run "the realities of the 
economic situation facing the region are daunting." With the added 
paradox that the "near term performance may be poorest in those 
countries pushing reform the hardest— Poland, Hungary and 
Yugoslavia— with output slowing and even declining as efforts to 
stabilize their economies and implement structural reforms prove 
disruptive." Even so, the long term growth prospects of these 
countries are said to be better than "those of the slow reformers."
The IMF coincides with the conclusion about the pace of 
economic reforms. Recognizing that there is neither theory nor 
precedents, the main issues are identified as the speed, the 
comprehensiveness and the sequencing of reforms.
On the speed, it is recognized that the transition will not be 
painless because inflation and unemployment may tend to increase. 
Even so, a "central lesson" is found in the "importance of 
establishing macroeconomic stability in the early stages of 
reform." Thus, the conclusion that "a rapid implementation of 
market-oriented reforms may be preferable to a gradual approach."
Given multiple linkages, it is better if each element of the 
program reinforces other elements, as well as if the costs and 
benefits are broadly shared rather than concentrated. Consequently, 
speed and comprehensiveness not only complement each other but make 
less important the issue of sequencing, all of which also argues 
against the proverbial search for a "third way," placed "between a 
centrally planned and a market economy."
Be it as it may, at least these recommendations do not sound 
as those coming out of certain academic circles recently described, 
by Nobel laureate and MIT Professor Paul Samuelson, as "undiluted, 
Charles Dickens capitalism."
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I. 4. THE HOUSTON SUMMIT (WDW/21/90 - 18 JULY 1990)
The comments on the global significance of "the first economic 
summit of the post-cold war era" did not wait for the ink to dry on 
the signatures of the final communique, issued by the seven heads 
of state and government from the participating industrialized 
democracies — Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and most probably for the last time, West Germany.
For instance, R.W. Apple Jr. in The New York Times saw the 
emergence of a "new, more subtle balance of power," based on the 
dominant presence of Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany and the 
less dramatic but firm assertiveness of Prime Minister Toshiki 
Kaifu of Japan.
David Hoffman in The Washington Post found evidence of the 
emergence of "a multipolar world in which the United States is but 
one of several players." To this effect, British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher was quoted as saying, "there are three great 
groups of nations at the summit, one based on the dollar, one based 
on the yen, and one based on the deutsche mark."
Finally, Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick in her syndicated column 
said she discovered that the U.S. President has "a trilateral 
vision that features Japan and Germany in starring roles alongside 
the United States and a new active triangular diplomacy based on 
the reality of the great economic power of these three nations."
Nonetheless, these conclusions are not all that clear when the 
results are observed by focusing on the conclusions, that appeared 
in both the political and the economic communiques, issued at the 
end of the summit meeting.
First of all, not many divisive subjects appeared in the 
political declaration, issued on July 10. The main theme was to 
welcome the turn towards democracy all over the world, including 
"the intention of the Soviet Union to move toward a democratic 
political system, as well as Soviet attempts to reform their 
economy along market principles."
The main differences were found in what were judged as the 
three issues that dominated the economic discussions: aid to the 
Soviet Union and to China, agricultural subsidies and the fate of 
the Uruguay Round, as well as the environment.
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Instead of approving a specific commitment of financial 
assistance, as the Europeans supposedly wanted, there was agreement 
that "technical assistance should be provided now to help the 
Soviet Union move to a market-oriented economy and to mobilize its 
own resources." Furthermore, the proverbial prescription "when in 
disagreement order a study" was observed by requesting from the IMF 
to convene the World Bank, the OECD and the designated president of 
the EBRD "to undertake, in close consultation with the Commission 
of the European Communities, a detailed study of the Soviet 
economy." True, this did not stop Chancellor Kohl from going to the 
Soviet Union immediately afterwards, to deliver only $3.5 billion 
in bilateral assistance already promised. Also, this did not stop 
Prime Minister Kaifu from announcing from the beginning to 
President Bush, "gently but firmly," that Japan planned to resume 
its financial aid and lending to China. This was considered 
evidence that Japan was taking "a new and more assertive role," or 
as "a Senior administration official" put it, "We can't stop them. 
They were going to do it anyway."
On agricultural subsidies, by far the most important issue on 
the summit's agenda for the developing countries, President Bush 
was described as "mounting an aggressive attack" against them. The 
result was a recognition that "the negotiations on agriculture 
should therefore be conducted in a framework that includes a common 
instrument of measurement, provides for commitments to be made in 
an equitable way among all countries, and takes into account 
concerns about food security." Moreover, it was decided that 
"agreement on such framework by the time of the July meeting of the 
Trade Negotiations Committee is critical to the completion of the 
Uruguay Round as a whole." Also, the seven supported "the text 
submitted by the Chairman of the Agricultural Negotiating Group as 
a means to intensify the negotiations," while also declaring their 
intention "to maintain a high level of personal involvement and to 
exercise the political leadership necessary to ensure the 
successful outcome of these negotiations." Consequently, whatever 
the final outcome, the fate of all the Uruguay Round now depends on 
the success that can be attained on the issue of agricultural 
subsidies.
Finally, by contrast with last year's summit, the environment 
receded from the top of the agenda. First of all, no consensus 
emerged on a German proposal, supported by other European leaders 
but opposed by President Bush, on setting a timetable for limiting 
the emission of gases that contribute to global warming. By 
contrast, all the participants were "ready to cooperate with the 
Government of Brazil on a comprehensive pilot program to counteract 
the threat to tropical rain forests in that country." The World 
Bank, in close cooperation with the Commission of the European 
Communities, was asked to prepare the proposal and to present it to 
the next Economic Summit.
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Given these results, it seems a bit premature to signal the 
birth of a new balance of power, of a multipolar world, or of a 
trilateral diplomacy, as the outcome of the first post-cold war 
summit. Rather, what these results reveal is that in the absence of 
a common enemy, despite the emergence of open disagreements, these 
differences are still not profound or bitter enough as to set the 
participants apart. Or, as President Bush observed in his closing 
remarks, in these "rapidly changing times . . . dealing with
entirely different times . . . w e ’re not urging everybody to march 
in lockstep."
I. 5. WORLD POVERTY. ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK 
(WDW/22/90 - 25 JULY 1990)
This year's World Development Report, issued by the staff of 
the World Bank, is dedicated to analyze world poverty and the means 
for its reduction. First, it measures poverty, qualitatively as 
well as quantitatively; second, it draws lessons from successful 
experiences in poverty. reduction; and third, it ends posing "a 
question that is also a challenge," what can be achieved in 
attacking poverty in what is left of the present century.
As usual, the Report contains a single chapter on the "trends 
in the world economy." The titles of the other eight chapters 
illustrate the wide scope of the treatment of this year's central 
issue; what do we know about the poor? progress on poverty; lessons 
for the future; promoting economic opportunities for the poor; 
delivering social services to the poor; transfers and safety nets; 
the 1980s: shocks, responses and the poor; international factors in 
reducing poverty; and finally, prospects for the poor.
The focus on poverty is all the more timely, in view of the 
performance of the world economy in 1989. First of all, if "the 
1980s closed happily for the industrial countries," with the 
exception of East Asia, "many developing countries have not merely 
failed to keep pace with the industrial countries; they have seen 
their incomes fall in absolute terms," particularly in Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa. These contrasting performances 
between developed and developing countries accurately depict the 
"diverging trends in the world economy."
Concerning the prospects, the Report warns that "if the 
patterns of regional income growth seen in the 1980s were to be 
repeated in the 1990s, the results would be disastrous for most of 
sub-Saharan Africa as well as for parts of Latin America and South 
Asia." In these terms, "the legacy of the 1980s remains evident,"
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because while "all regions are expected to have positive per capita 
income growth, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to 
achieve their long-run potential."
Turning to poverty, the Report focuses on where to find the 
poor. It reveals that in 1985 more than a quarter of the world's 
population, or 1,115 million persons, lived with less than one 
dollar a day, or below an upper poverty line of $370 a year. Nearly 
one half of the world's poor thus defined live in South Asia, a 
region that accounts for roughly one third of the world's 
population. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for more than 16 percent of 
world poverty, a smaller, but still highly disproportionate share, 
since it comprises only about 11 percent of world population.
Qualitatively, the worst forms of poverty are found among the 
rural poor, in the large households of ethnic minorities where 
women and children are often worse than men, among whom nearly all 
income is spent on consumption, with about half spent on food.
Successful experiences, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, can be 
explained by the application of a two-pronged strategy. A "first 
component provides opportunities," encouraging a pattern of 
economic growth to encourage the use of "the poor's most abundant 
asset— labor." The second component "increases the capacity of the 
poor to take advantage of these opportunities," by the provision of 
basic social services, such as primary education, primary health 
care and family planning.
Still, to reach almost all the poor, it is necessary to 
implement "a program of well-targeted transfers and safety nets as 
an essential complement to the basic strategy." The transfers 
should be aimed at the sick, the old, the disabled, widows and 
orphans. The safety nets should be aimed at those who remain 
vulnerable to natural disasters and macroeconomic shocks.
The eighties also showed that in a context of painful 
macroeconomic adjustment, in the short term, the poor are at risk, 
because "policies to reduce poverty involve a tradeoff." In what 
amounts to one of the major statements contained in the REPORT, 
this tradeoff "is not between growth and the reduction of poverty." 
Rather, "the principal tradeoff, specially in the short run, is 
between the interests of the poor and those of the nonpoor."
Admitting that this tradeoff is "politically sensitive," the 
Report concludes that the two-pronged strategy is "more feasible 
than other strategies." For instance, Korea and Japan are mentioned 
as successful examples of land redistribution, but wherever these 
reforms encounter great political obstacles, "investment in 
education as the best way of augmenting the assets of the poor, is 
more likely to succeed."
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Also, "the strategy requires an increase in certain categories 
of public spending that specifically benefit the poor." 
Nonetheless, the Report recognizes, without getting into the 
details of where to cut, that "it is possible to shift public 
spending in favor of the poor, even within an overall framework of 
fiscal discipline."
President Conable recognizes in the foreword that, "although 
domestic policy is critical to the reduction of poverty, 
international assistance is needed to support countries' efforts." 
Consequently, in another major statement on conditionality, 
President Conable proposes that "the allocation of aid should be 
more closely linked to a country's commitment to pursue development 
programs geared to the reduction of poverty."
Additionally, a "unique opportunity" is identified from the 
present easing of international tensions, because "a cut of only 10 
percent in military spending by the countries of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization would pay for a doubling" of the $51 billion of 
official development assistance granted in 1988.
Looking ahead to the present decade, the Report projects that 
a rate of growth of 3 percent in the industrialized countries, as 
well as an increase in real aid flows at the same rate, to support 
the successful application of the two-pronged strategy, can 
contribute to a reduction of 400 million of the developing world's 
poor, bringing the total to 825 million by the turn of the century. 
This goal is considered feasible because "the principal elements of 
an effective strategy are well understood and that the external 
resources needed to support it could be made available at little 
cost to the industrial countries."
I. 6. THE RETURN OF OIL (WDW/23/90 - 5 SEPTEMBER 1990)
That the largest amounts of commercial energy worldwide are 
consumed by a very small group of industrialized countries and 
originate from the most unstable and tense region of the present 
international system has led to the third oil shock of the last two 
decades. Such concentrations of supply and demand more easily give 
ground to simple explanations than they support the adoption of 
corrective measures aimed at reducing the persistent degree of 
vulnerability of the present world economy to such destabilizing 
shocks.
On the supply side, petroleum accounted in 1989 for almost 40 
percent of world commercial energy, followed by 28 percent from 
coal; 21 percent from natural gas; 7 percent from hydroelectricity;
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and 6 percent from nuclear power. Geographical concentration of 
production also prevails because almost two thirds of the world's 
proven oil reserves are located in the Persian Gulf, with 45 
percent of them in Kuwait (9.3 percent); Iraq (9.9 percent) and 
Saudi Arabia (25.2 percent).
Similar degrees of concentration can be found on the demand 
side. For instance, over half of the world's oil is consumed by the 
industrialized countries. In 1989, OECD members accounted for 56 
percent of world oil demand, with the United States as the most 
voracious consumer, accounting for 26 percent. The United States 
imported 8 million barrels per day (b/d) , or 46 percent of its 
domestic supply, with 2.1 million b/d, or about 12 percent, from 
the Persian Gulf. This shows that, in 1989, the United States was 
twice as dependent on Persian Gulf oil than in 1973, when the same 
imports amounted to about one million b/d, or about 6 percent of 
total U.S. supply.
Overall, in 1989, North America and Western Europe consumed 
nearly half of the world's oil output, but contributed only 23 
percent to world supply. By contrast, the Persian Gulf nations 
accounted for 26 percent of global oil supply and only for 4.5 
percent of world demand. Other regions of the world, such as Latin 
America, were relatively marginal, producing slightly more than 10 
percent of global oil production and consuming about 8 percent of 
total demand. Also, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe supplied 
one fifth of world production, while they consumed about 18 percent 
of global demand.
In the long run, left to itself, this disparity between 
producers and consumers can only accentuate itself, given the 
imbalance between current production and proven reserves. For 
instance, the ratio of proven reserves to annual production reveals 
that at present levels of production proven reserves in North 
America will only last a decade. The same ratio for Western Europe 
indicates that reserves will only last about 13 years. By contrast, 
if the Persian Gulf nations continue producing at present rates, 
their reserves will last over a century. Also, the reserves-to- 
production ratio for OPEC is around 92 years.
Since these trends are so obvious why, it can be asked, 
producers and consumers alike have not designed policies and 
strategies to counter this concentration through the 
diversification of sources. Besides other culprits such as the 
environmental movement, free market ideology, regional disputes, or 
worsening budget deficits, there is the fact, mentioned by James J. 
MacKenzie, from The World Resources Institute, that before the 
Iraqi invasion, in constant dollars, gasoline prices in the United 
States were at the lowest level of the last 40 years. To the point 
that, in the United States in 1989, "gasoline was cheaper than any 
other liquid, including bottled water."
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Furthermore, public opinion in the United States, as revealed 
by a Wall street Journal/NBC News poll, remains profoundly 
ambivalent about acceptable measures to counter these imbalances. 
For instance, in the abstract, 80 percent of the respondents favor 
"tougher conservation measures," but 62 percent oppose taxing 
gasoline to encourage conservation and 57 percent oppose the 
construction of new nuclear power plants. This only demonstrates, 
concluded Barbara Rosewicz in The Wall Street Journal "chronic 
unwillingness to suffer short-term pain for long-term gain."
In these circumstances, it is most likely that the third oil 
shock will give the final push into recession to an already 
sluggish economy. The Federal Reserve has revealed that in July the 
U.S. economy's "pace was slow or had slackened markedly." By 
contrast with the previous two oil shocks, that led to the 
recessions of 1973-75 and of 1981-82, this time, there seems to be 
agreement that the increase in oil prices will only precipitate the 
recession that was already looming. Nonetheless, some "optimists" 
can still be found that are predicting only the return of 
stagflation as a result of the third oil shock.
I. 7. THE SECOND WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK <WEO)
(WDW/28/90 - 10 OCTOBER 1990)
The second issue of the World Economic Outlook released by the 
staff of the IMF during the annual meetings, was almost buried 
under the barrage of speculation unleashed by the hike in oil 
prices. When these prices soared beyond the $26 per barrel 
anticipated for 1990, the WEO's projections were immediately 
dismissed as too optimistic.
Nonetheless, in the agitation generated by the Gulf crisis, 
several mid-term projections that appear in the second WEO were 
overlooked. In the excerpt of the WEO released to the press, on 
September 19, chapter I reviews recent economic developments and 
the forecasts for 1990 and 1991, with an appendix containing a 
scenario illustrating the possible effects of the rise in the world 
price of oil. Chapter II presents the medium-term baseline 
projections for the industrial countries, including an examination 
of the likely implications of German unification and a review of 
recent progress toward economic integration in the European 
Community. Finally, Chapter III describes the medium-term baseline 
scenario for developing countries, as well as an alternative 
scenario based on "a less optimistic set of assumptions about 
domestic economic policies."
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For instance, even before the events in the Middle East, the 
WEO saw the world economy experiencing a "global slowdown," in 
1990, to about 2 percent, from 3 percent in 1989.
In the industrial countries, real GNP is projected to rise by 
2 1/2 percent, in both 1990 and 1991, down from an average of 
almost 4 percent in 1988-89. While in the developing countries, 
real GDP is expected to decline from 3 percent in 1989 to 2 1/4 
percent in 1990. The slowdown in the developing countries is 
attributed to the short-run effects of the most recent tightening 
of financial policies, as well as to the effects of "unfavorable 
external conditions." Singled out among these last are the less 
rapid expansion in world trade, the persistence of the decline in 
the prices of non-oil primary commodities, as well as the 
continuation of high international interest rates.
Beyond the short-term implications of the events in oil 
markets, the medium term outlook for the world economy is seen as 
"strongly influenced by the far-reaching changes currently taking 
place in Europe," with three sets of events considered decisive.
First, the restructuring of the economies in Eastern Europe 
and in the U.S.S.R., "from relatively inefficient production and 
distribution systems based on central planning toward more market- 
oriented systems." In the short-run, output is expected to decline 
in most of these countries in 1990 and to stagnate in 1991, as a 
result in part of the stabilization measures and the economic 
reforms being implemented.
Second, the unification of Germany in the short-run is also 
expected to generate a temporary fall in output and employment, 
while aggregate demand for imported investment goods is expected to 
expand. German unification will also result in a rise in global 
investment relative to world saving. In the prevailing context of 
high levels of capacity utilization in almost all the industrial 
countries, this is expected to cause some upward pressure on 
prices, on interest rates and on the value of the German mark.
Finally, the ongoing movement toward economic integration 
within the European Community, particularly the scheduled 
completion of a single market in 1992, will boost investment and 
sustain output growth near capacity limits, for the next several 
years in the twelve member countries.
The transformations in Europe will generate a rise in the 
demand for resources that, together with the pressing needs of the 
developing countries, are bound to lead to a shortage of capital, 
to such an extent as to "underscore the importance and the urgency 
of increasing world saving." To achieve this, "the most effective 
way" is to intensify "the process of fiscal consolidation, 
particularly in those countries where fiscal deficits remain high,
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such as Canada, Italy, the United States and many of the smaller 
industrial countries."
Dealing with inflation still ranks as the top priority of 
monetary policies in the industrial countries because, besides the 
pressure on interest rates exercised by the demand for resources 
from Eastern Europe and Germany, a worsening of inflationary 
expectations has appeared. Thus, the conclusion is derived that "a 
significant relaxation of monetary policy would yield neither an 
enduring reduction in interest rates nor a lasting improvement in 
employment." This conclusion was highlighted by the U.S. press 
because it takes the side of the Federal Reserve in its ongoing 
debate with the Treasury about interest rates.
In the case of the developing countries, economic policies are 
singled out as having played "a critical role," because "growth has 
been strong and inflation has remained relatively low" in those 
countries "that have avoided debt-servicing difficulties." While 
those "that have encountered debt-servicing difficulties," have 
experienced slow growth and accelerated inflation. Even so, 
"external factors" also played a significant role. Among them, the 
plight of non-oil commodities is specifically recognized, because 
their prices "declined sharply during 1989," as a result of the 
slowdown in world economic activity, as well as improved supplies. 
Furthermore, continuing its decade-long downturn, it is projected 
that non-oil commodities will decline by 8 percent in 1990. Thus, 
in the ten years since 1980, the Fund's index for these products' 
prices has "dropped by some 40 percent relative to the export price 
of manufactures of industrial countries."
II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1. INTO THE NINETIES (WDW/1/90 - 17 JANUARY 1990)
As if the calendar had the power to influence the evolution of 
events, the eighties concluded with a rush to get rid of several 
situations that apparently were deemed inadequate for the new 
decade. In a way, this is only an anticipation of what can be 
expected to happen with the coming change of millennium. Thus, with 
the nineties, has arrived the "fin de siecle" atmosphere that will 
intensify as we inexorably move towards the new century.
The eighties brought many surprises that discredited almost 
all predictions. Recall, for instance, the Club of Rome's 
Malthusian limits to growth or the specter of energy shortages.
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The decade began with the U.S. economy experiencing double­
digit inflation and with its subsequent collapse opening the door 
to the longest period of sustained peacetime expansion— seven 
straight years of economic growth, surpassed only by the nine years 
of expansion of the sixties. Finally, to deliberately mislead 
forecasters, the second half of 1989 witnessed a vertiginous 
succession of events that astonished even the most skeptical, 
signalling the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a 
relaxation of the major tension of the present international 
system.
Such a decade, particularly its exhilarating epilogue, 
apparently has sobered even the most audacious forecasters, because 
almost all the predictions that have been offered recently barely 
venture into 1992.
For instance, a survey of forty economists by The Wall Street 
Journal reveals that, if helped by lower interest rates, the U.S. 
economy will experience its eighth consecutive year of expansion. 
This optimism is tempered by the recognition that growth in 1990 
will be sluggish, because according to another survey by the 
National Association of Business Economists, the U.S. economy will 
expand at only 1.8 percent.
Nonetheless, even such sluggishness has given ground to the 
obstinate question— raised by Leonard Silk in The New York Times, 
followed by Jodie Allen in The Washington Post and by Donald Lambro 
in The Washington Times— if the business cycle has gone "out of 
business."
Admittedly, it all depends from the rift that has appeared 
between the White House and the Federal Reserve. As pointed out by 
Harvard Professor and former Dukakis adviser Lawrence Summers, "all 
previous recoveries have died not of old age, they've been 
murdered."
Be it as it may, better watch closely the confrontation 
between Budget Director Richard Darman and the FED Chairman Alan 
Greenspan. Briefly, Mr. Greenspan considers that the White House is 
not doing enough to reduce the budget deficit, while Mr. Darman 
considers that the FED is almost exclusively focused on the fight 
against inflation. For Mr. Darman, slow-growth policies are 
partially responsible for the persistence of the budget deficit, 
consequently, a sluggish economy will only step-up the pressures 
on the FED to ease monetary policy by lowering interest rates.
Still, optimists hold that "structural changes" in the U.S. 
economy have led to the "end of the traditional business cycle." 
Jodie T. Allen, in The Washington Post. identified some of these 
changes, in the form of more fluid financial markets, a less 
vulnerable manufacturing sector, faster reactions and feedback to
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market signals, more flexible labor markets and better policy 
making.
Also, there are some grounds for hope. The European 
Community's becoming a single market in 1992, as well as the 
changes in Eastern Europe, have led to predict that, at least in 
the first half of the nineties, Western Europe will grow between 3 
and 3.5 percent, by contrast with the United States that is 
expected to grow at an average of around 2.5 percent. In these 
terms, Europe would perform the "locomotive role as the U.S. 
economy slows down."
Forecasters are frequently criticized because they project 
present trends. This time, the present does not lend itself to easy 
projections, the nineties look perplexing and fascinating.
II. 2. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF THE UNION 
(WDW/5/90 - 14 february 1990)
On February 6, 1990, President Bush issued the first Economic 
Report of his mandate. In the message of transmission to Congress, 
the President addresses the following issues: 1) goals and
principles; 2) macroeconomic prospects and policies; 3) encouraging 
economic growth; 4) regulatory reform; 5) the global economy; and
6) looking ahead.
President Bush emphasizes that "since 1982, American firms and 
workers have produced the longest peacetime expansion on record and 
created more than 20 million jobs," with the coincident 
"containment of inflation" considered "a milestone in postwar 
history."
In 1989, the United States regained its position as the 
world's "leading exporter," and retained the position of the 
world's "leading job creator." Beyond these accomplishments, the 
task ahead is "to improve on that record, deal with inherited 
problems, and meet the new challenges and seize the new 
opportunities."
The Administration's primary economic goal is defined as "to 
achieve the highest possible rate of sustainable economic growth," 
by following five principles:
1) "Reduce government borrowing by slowing the growth of 
Federal spending while economic growth raises revenue until the 
budget is balanced, and reduce the national debt thereafter;"
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2) "Support a credible, systematic monetary policy program 
that sustains maximum economic growth while controlling and 
reducing inflation;"
3) "Remove barriers to innovation, investment, work, and 
saving in the tax, legal, and regulatory systems;"
4) "Avoid unnecessary regulation and design necessary 
regulatory programs to harness market forces effectively to serve 
the Nation's interest;" and
5) "Continue to lead the world to freer trade and more open 
markets, and to support market-oriented reforms around the world."
Macroeconomic performance in 1989 is described as "more 
moderate," with GNP growth at 1.9 percent. Although " in sharp 
contrast to most past periods of low unemployment and high capacity 
utilization, inflation was kept firmly in check," at 4.1 percent in 
1989, down from 4.5 percent in 1988. For 1990, the rate of 
expansion is projected at a "slightly faster pace."
The èncouragement and promotion of economic growth will be 
based on the removal of "obstacles to saving, investing, 
innovating, and working," with investments in plant, equipment, 
technology, education and research singled out as the main 
instruments.
Certain contrasts appear with the previous Administration, 
particularly regarding regulatory policies, which led Paul A. 
Gigot, in the Wall Street Journal to suggest that "whatever you do, 
don't call them supply-siders."
For instance, "a key function of government," is said to be 
the construction of "a legal framework that enhances the health and 
vigor of the private sector," or that "government action may be 
called for where competitive private markets do not exist or cannot 
function."
There are also other manifestations of the "pragmatism" that 
is said to define the present Administration, such as the 
requirement that "regulatory targets should be chosen by careful 
cost-benefit analysis," as well as the conclusion that "in some 
cases, well-designed regulation can serve the public interest." 
Thus, Gigot concludes that the Report is better characterized as 
"prudent voodoo."
On the global economy, the Administration is "staunchly 
opposed to managed trade," with "the highest trade policy priority" 
described as the "successful completion of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations," while market-oriented reforms are recommended for 
the Eastern European and the heavily indebted developing countries.
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Finally, "looking ahead," the President concludes with the 
upbeat message that with the proposed "economic principles and 
policies," the United States "can enjoy strong, sustainable 
economic growth and use the fruits of that growth to raise living 
standards, solve longstanding problems, deal with new challenges, 
and make the most of new opportunities."
The annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers, that 
follows the President's message of transmission to Congress, is 
divided in the following seven chapters: 1) building on success;
2) developments in 1989 and future prospects; 3) design of fiscal, 
monetary, and financial policies; 4) investing in America's 
future; 5) human resources in the 1990s; 6) the economy and the 
environment; and 7) growth and market reform in the global 
economy.
The first chapter summarizes the contents of the report and 
concludes that "sustained, robust growth will raise living 
standards, maintain the Nation's position of global leadership, 
bring greater opportunity for Americans, and provide the resources 
necessary to make progress toward satisfying an array of public and 
private needs and wants."
On the prospects, the conclusion is that "as the U.S. economy 
moves into the eighth year of growth, there is a strong basis for 
continued expansion in the 1990s," because "the remarkable length 
of the current expansion, by itself, does not increase the 
likelihood of an imminent recession."
Macroeconomic policies should "emphasize long-run economic 
performance" by means of "increased national saving and investment, 
controlling and gradually reducing inflation, and fostering a safe 
and competitive financial marketplace." Such policies will "ensure 
both continued leadership by the United States in the world economy 
and rising living standards for American families."
Investing in America's future demands an increase in the 
"rate of investment in physical, intellectual, and human capital," 
as well as to "raise the low national saving rate."
Human resources in the 1990s are characterized by "a new set 
of labor market concerns," that move away from "the availability of 
jobs that has dominated macroeconomic policy discussion since the 
Great Depression." These new concerns center around "the 
availability of workers and skills."
On the economy and the environment, "both economic growth and 
environmental quality are desirable policy goals,” with three 
principles guiding regulation: first, realistic and risk-reduction 
goals that balance benefits and costs; second, strategies that work
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with rather than against market incentives, instead of less 
effective command and control regulation; and third, dissemination 
of scientific and technical information about environmental and 
health risks.
Finally, the challenge in the global economy is to build 
upon the success of the U.S. economy "to continue support for 
economic and political freedom around the world."
II. 3. RECESSION IS HERE (WDW/34/90 - 21 NOVEMBER 1990)
One question recently heard and about which there is no easy 
answer is when does a recession really start? The accepted wisdom 
is that recession happens when the gross national product (GNP) 
decreases for six consecutive months. One difficulty with this 
measurement is that it can only be verified "post-festum," after 
the six months have elapsed, once the figures have been released 
and then revised.
The National Bureau of Economic Research, a prestigious 
private research institution considered "the arbiter of when 
recessions begin and end," offers the following definition: "a
recurring period of decline in total output, income, employment and 
trade, usually lasting from six months to a year and marked by 
widespread contractions in many sectors of the economy."
This is close to the definition offered in recent testimony by 
the FED Chairman Alan Greenspan, who described a recession as a 
"cumulative unwinding of economic activity," by contrast with a few 
months of mildly negative GNP growth that can be reversed by the 
revision of earlier figures. What is required, according to the 
FED's Chairman, is a steep, widespread decline in economic 
activity.
This same definition was used by the FED Chairman, in 
testimony before the U.S. November elections, to refer to the 
economy's health as only "very sluggish," because during the first 
semester of 1990 GNP grew by only one percent and even by less than 
that during the second quarter.
Nonetheless, the consumers have already made up their minds. 
In response to a survey from the University of Michigan, 71 percent 
thought that bad times were ahead, compared with 42 percent in July 
and 29 percent a year earlier. Furthermore, the University of 
Michigan Index of Consumer Confidence, compared to a February 1966 
survey representing 100, fell to 63.9, or 24.3 points since July,
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the sharpest fall in consumer confidence in any three month period 
registered in 44 years. Still, this was not the lowest figure in 
the Index, which remained at 51.7 percent registered in 1980.
On November 8, President Bush announced that he would meet at 
Camp David with his top economic advisers — Secretary Brady, Budget 
Director Darman, Vice-President Quayle, Chief of Staff Sununu and 
Chief Economic Adviser Boskin—  because the nation is "in some 
tough times now," or as acknowledged by Mr. Boskin the economy "at 
best is in a lull." These meetings led to the recognition by 
President Bush, a week later, that he was concerned about "a 
downturn" and "a slowdown."
This practically settled the discussion about the recession's 
existence. President Bush said the answer to "the major question 
mark in terms of the depth of the slowdown or recession" depends 
from the rise in oil prices, caused by the Persian Gulf crisis. 
Thus, the President also set the terms of the debate that usually 
follows the recognition of the phenomenon's existence, concerning 
how long it will last.
Apparently in recessions, as in wars, it is almost always 
assumed that they will be short, when they begin. Or as Stephen 
McNees from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston declared, "you never 
expect a big one."
This time, given the central role attributed to the rise in 
oil prices, as the "final straw" that pushed the U.S. economy into 
recession, different scenarios about oil prices have become the 
basis for most of the predictions that have been offered about the 
length of the recession.
According to the World Bank, there are four possible 
scenarios: 1) "rapid return to normalcy," in which oil prices will 
rapidly average between $17 and $18 per barrel, not very far from 
the $16.40 dollars averaged during the first half of 1990; 2)
"short-term uncertainty," predicts an average oil price for the 
rest of this year of between $31 and $32 per barrel, and an average 
price of $29 and $25 for 1991 and 1992, respectively; 3) "prolonged 
uncertainty," forecasts an average of $29 per barrel during the 
next five years; and 4) "war," will immediately drive the price to 
$65, to fall and remain once the war ends between $30 and $40 
during the next five years.
Of course, there are other factors invoked to justify the 
belief that the recession will be short. First, it is said that the 
FED does not want a long recession, as Princeton University Alan 
Blinder declared, "this Fed seems much more recession-averse than 
previous Feds." Second, politics is offered as another reason, 
because if the economy returns to a growth path in 1991, it will 
make a decisive contribution to the re-election of President Bush. 
Third, also cited are modern techniques, such as "just-in-time"
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inventory management, that make for "lean and trim" ratios of 
inventories to sales, to avoid the traditional accumulation of 
unsold goods by retailers that leads to drastic cuts in production. 
Finally, there is the low dollar and the prospect of its further 
decline, as a consequence of interest rate reductions, which will 
make U.S. exports "the economy's silver lining."
In conclusion, the bottom line of "the case for a mild 
recession," wrote David Wessel in The Wall Street Journal "rests on 
faith— not only in Fed policy-makers, but in the resiliency of the 
U.S. economy to withstand oil shocks, bank failures and turbulent 
markets.”
II. 4. U.S. RELIANCE ON IMPORTED OIL 
(WDW/35/90) - 28 NOVEMBER 1990)
Some of the circumstances that have led the world economy to 
experience its third oil shock in less than twenty years can be 
found in the pronounced levels of concentration of supply and 
demand.
For instance, on the supply side, levels of geographic 
concentration are of such magnitude that almost two thirds of the 
world's proven reserves are located in the Persian Gulf, with the 
concentration of almost half in three countries — Kuwait, 9.3 
percent; Iraq, 9.9 percent; and Saudi Arabia, 25.2 percent 
(WDW/23/90).
Similar or worst levels of concentration can be found on the 
demand side. The United States with only four percent of the 
world's population consumes almost forty percent of the world's 
production of gasoline. In 1989, oil represented 42 percent of the 
U.S. total energy supply, with 12 percent imported from the Middle 
East.
There is also high concentration within these already 
concentrated levels of demand for oil. According to James J. 
MacKenzie, from the Washington-based ecological think-tank World 
Resources Institute (WRI), the transportation sector absorbs almost 
two thirds of total U.S. oil demand, with motor vehicles consuming 
about half, followed by industry using 24 percent and buildings as 
well as electric utilities together consuming about 13 percent.
Furthermore, since the first oil shock, with the notable 
exception of transportation, impressive reductions in oil 
consumption have been registered in many sectors of the U.S. 
economy, by means of greater degrees of efficiency and 
substitution. Electric utilities have reduced oil consumption by
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more than half, residential and commercial buildings by 40 percent 
and industry by 10 percent.
Nonetheless, since 1973, transportation has registered an 
increase of 20 percent in the consumption of oil. Consequently, 
despite some impressive cuts in other sectors of the U.S. economy, 
in 1989, total consumption of oil remained at the same level it had 
attained in 1973.
From the previous analysis, in a study released recently by 
WRI, J. MacKenzie derives the conclusion that to achieve additional 
reductions in the demand for oil in the United States "the greatest 
opportunities lie in transportation, where improved fuel efficiency 
and — in the longer term—  the substitution of alternative energy 
sources can lead to major cuts in petroleum use."
More than ninety percent of the energy used by the U.S. 
transportation sector is derived from oil, with passenger cars and 
trucks accounting for more than two thirds. Only motor vehicles, in 
1989, accounted for 80 percent of all energy consumed in 
transportation, with passenger cars accounting for 40 percent.
Moreover, the consumption of gasoline has been increasing, by 
as much as 15 percent since 1982. In Mackenzie's terms, this 
"national indifference about rising petroleum use," is no surprise, 
because it is the result of the decline in the price of motor 
vehicle fuel in the United States, which in constant dollars in 
1988 "dropped to a forty-year low."
An exploration of several alternative transportation options 
to the present gasoline/diesel technology leads MacKenzie to the 
following conclusions.
First, ethanol would be nationally produced but it would be 
relatively expensive and it requires large amounts of land to grow 
corn, which in the end consumes almost as much energy as the 
ethanol that would be produced. By contrast, methanol and 
compressed natural gas would be imported and both would provide 
only small clean-air benefits compared to gasoline.
The most attractive option for the next decade, according to 
MacKenzie, would be electric vehicles because they represent a low- 
polluting and oil-free form of transportation. The main obstacles 
to their development are the difficulties that have been found in 
designing adequate "electricity-storage devices." The U.S. Energy 
Department and the automobile industry "are pressing for a major 
new initiative to develop a commercial battery for electric cars."
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The degree in which electric cars are clean and non-polluting 
depends from where comes the energy to charge the batteries. For 
instance, coal-fired electricity plants will produce sulfur dioxide 
and other gases that contribute to smog, acid rain and possible 
global warming.
Nonetheless, even after emissions at the power plant are taken 
into account, a comparison reveals that electric cars produce much 
smaller quantities of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide as well as 
less ozone, the main ingredient in smog. As for "greenhouse" gases, 
such as carbon dioxide, which contribute to climatic warming, 
electric cars would produce about 25 percent less per mile than 
gasoline engines.
Finally, in the long-run, if hydrogen costs could be lowered, 
MacKenzie concludes that hydrogen-powered vehicles would become 
very attractive, because they would reduce oil imports as well as 
the emission of greenhouse and air-polluting gases.
In the meantime, as long as gasoline prices remain low, 
technological innovations in the automobile industry, instead of 
improving fuel economy, will be dedicated to improve "performance," 
understood as the number of seconds necessary to take a car from a 
standstill to 60 miles an hour.
III. TRADE
III. 1. FREE VS. MANAGED TRADE (WDW/3/90 - 31 JANUARY 1990)
The debate about the trade deficit of the United States is 
acquiring ominous dimensions. To explore alternatives, the 
Twentieth Century Fund, a prestigious, non-profit and non-partisan 
research foundation, that supports "timely analyses of economic, 
political and social issues," created "an independent Task Force."
The Fund commissioned a background paper from Professor Gary 
Clyde Hufbauer, from Georgetown University. Also, distinguished 
personalities were invited to participate in the task force, with 
Professor Anne Krueger, from Duke University, acting as 
chairperson. The other participants were: Lawrence J. Brainard, 
Bankers Trust; Patrick D. Choate, TRW Inc.; Harry L. Freeman, 
American Express Company; Paul Krugman, MIT; Robert Kruttner, The 
New Republic; Robert Z. Lawrence, The Brookings Institution; Clyde 
V. Prestowitz, The Carnegie Endowment; Howard D. Samuel, AFL-CIO; 
Herbert Stein, The American Enterprise Institute; Alan Wolff, 
attorney.
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More impressive than the composition of the task force is that 
its members were unable to agree on a single report. Instead, the 
Fund published a book, The Free Trade Debate. containing two 
separate reports and Professor Hufbauer's background paper. As 
stated in the preface, this result "mirrors the divisions among 
even the most knowledgeable on these difficult issues."
The task force fractured along very revealing lines. For 
instance, the free trade report was signed by all the academics—  
Professors Krueger, Krugman and Hufbauer; by both bankers— Messrs. 
Brainard and Freeman; and by two of the senior fellows from well 
known Washington think tanks— Messrs. Lawrence and Stein. By 
contrast, the other report was signed by two well-known Japan 
critics—  Messrs. Choates and Prestowitz; as well as by Mr. 
Kuttner, the journalist, Mr. Samuel, the trade union representative 
and by Mr. Wolff, the attorney.
This corresponds to present U.S. attitudes, where a new 
"revisionist" school holds that, to "contain" Japan, the U.S. 
should employ the same tactics of managed trade that apparently 
have worked wonders for Japanese external economic policy.
Believers in free trade are seen as naive, while some of their 
universities and think tanks are said to be "on the Japanese 
payroll." This is the result of a massive effort by Japan to 
influence "American hearts and minds," to counter the growing 
resentment against its persistent trade surplus, that amounted to 
lobbying expenditures estimated in $150 million for 1988 and $250 
million for 1989.
Against this background should be placed both reports' main 
conclusions.
As indicated by its title, "The Case for Free Trade,"
identifies five different schools in the present public debate; 1) 
unilateral liberalization with limited exceptions; 2) reciprocal 
concessions; 3) threat of restrictions; 4) accommodation to foreign 
styles of industrial policy; and 5) selective unilateral 
restrictions.
Only the first three are claimed as theirs by the supporters 
of free trade. "Established approaches to trade policy" are said to 
"have worked well." Also, "putting aside the tactics of 
liberalization," they conclude that "relatively free trade within 
a world system of common rules should continue to serve as the 
guiding star of U.S. policy."
On the causes of the U.S. trade deficit, the free traders
assert that these "have a macroeconomic character; namely, savings
and investment imbalances in the United States and abroad, 
particularly in Europe and Japan." Furthermore, "trade policy on 
its own can make little if any dent in the trade deficit."
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The free traders differ from the dissenters on three critical 
issues. First, national differences in the organization of trade 
policy, "make it difficult for the big economic powers to find 
common ground." Thus, "as a starting point," they suggest "a world 
system of consistently applied rules and approaches." Second, free 
traders prefer a "rules-oriented" approach, against a "results- 
oriented" approach, particularly because "sector-by-sector" 
policies are seen as "a great danger." Third, free traders are very 
critical of "aggressive reciprocity," because "the new emphasis on 
unilateral retaliation will ultimately erode political support for 
an open trading system." Finally, free trade areas and common 
markets are considered "a promising approach for the development of 
agreed rules and the eventual removal of behind-the-border 
distortions." Moreover, "after the Uruguay Round, an OECD-plus 
common market" is proposed, "encompassing present OECD members and 
new arrivals." Even so, they "strongly urge the Bush administration 
to concentrate its immediate efforts on the Uruguay Round," warning 
that for the GATT talks "to achieve any degree of success, the 
United States must be prepared to make concessions to receive 
concessions."
The dissenters' report is titled "A Fresh Look at Trade 
Policy." Global economic imbalances are "troublesome," because in 
the U.S. they have "led to job loss in export and import competing 
industries, sectors that tend to pay higher wages;" second, the 
deficit has transformed the United States "from the world's largest 
creditor (+$141.1 billion in 1981) to the world's largest debtor (- 
$532.5 billion in 1 9 8 8 ) finally, imbalances "threaten the 
stability of the world economy," and make the United States "depend 
from the kindness of strangers."
For the dissenters, the industrial and technological 
leadership of the United States continues to erode, because beyond 
the internal causes for this decline, U.S. trading partners "adopt 
conscious policies to promote strategic industries." Finally, the 
GATT multilateral trading system, is in a "rickety" state, because 
of the emergence of regional blocs, the ubiquity of export 
restraint agreements, a weak dispute settlement mechanism, and a 
wide range of uncovered activities, such as agriculture, services, 
intellectual property and investment.
The debate on trade policy in the United States is seen as 
centered around three fundamental questions: 1) whether to adopt 
different trade policies for trading partners with different 
industrial policies; 2) how to "respond to foreign export 
targeting;" and 3) how to choose among "multilateral, plurilateral, 
bilateral or unilateral trade policy approaches."
The adoption of "tailored trade policies" is proposed, because 
"the 'rules-based' approach has been tried and found wanting," 
thus, "setting market-share objectives may be necessary on a 
transitional basis to push the market to operate more freely."
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Also, certain "market outcomes," such as "the loss of a 'critical' 
industry" can be "unacceptable." Finally, "the real question is 
which of the different approaches is most ideally suited for which 
problems."
The dissenters propose "a trade surplus by 1993," because "in 
the final analysis, the United States cannot allow critical 
decisions about the evolution of its economy to be made by default, 
dictated by the narrow and chauvinistic trade and industrial 
policies of other countries."
So much for the terms of this crucial debate, whose outcome, 
given the relative weight of the United States, will determine the 
prosperity of the world economy.
III. 2. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL ON INVESTMENT 
(WDW/4/90 - 7 FEBRUARY 1990)
As with agriculture and services, on January 29, 1990, the 
U.S. delegation submitted in Geneva a proposal of agreement to 
regulate what are called "trade related investment measures 
(TRIMs) ." As described by the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador 
Carla Hills, "a GATT agreement on TRIMs would help reduce 
distortions in the trading system and encourage much needed 
investment in developing countries." Considered "a high priority 
issue," the U.S. position is that "a successful Uruguay Round 
outcome must include a comprehensive, effective agreement to 
discipline TRIMs."
The proposal was presented in the form of "a draft legal 
text," containing seven articles and an annex of definitions, 
before the GATT Negotiating Group on Trade Related Investment 
Measures. Admittedly, it moves a "step further" from the more 
general presentation made by the U.S. delegation, on 7 July 1989, 
in the form of a document titled A Structure for Negotiating a 
Comprehensive Agreement on TRIMs (MTN.GNG/NG12/W15).
In that opportunity, several delegations remarked that the 
proposal needed to go beyond the conceptual level, of notions such 
as transparency and non-discrimination, to contribute meaningfully 
to the negotiations. Consequently, with the presentation of the 
"draft TRIMs Agreement," the U.S. delegation hopes to move the 
discussions "from the general to the specific, from the conceptual 
to the concrete."
First of all, a TRIM is defined as "any investment measure 
which restricts or distorts trade by, for example, restricting or 
displacing imports; restricting, displacing or requiring exports;
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or otherwise nullifying or impairing any benefits accruing directly 
or indirectly to a contracting party, taking into account imports 
or exports which would have occurred had the measure not been 
imposed."
A "two-tiered approach" is proposed to "discipline" these 
measures. Article I "prohibits" those that "inherently restrict or 
distort trade." The term "inherently" means that "one can 
reasonably presume that there will be trade restriction or 
distortion because the adverse trade effects are inseparable from 
the underlying measure."
Some of the specifically prohibited investment measures are 
those which "accord a preference to domestic goods over imports, or 
act as quantitative restrictions on imports or exports."
Article II covers those investment measures that "do not 
inherently restrict or distort trade but may have adverse trade 
effects in some circumstances." Instead of directly prohibiting 
them, the agreement establishes two obligations. The first is 
non-discrimination, by which a foreign company should be treated 
"at least as well" as is treated "the most favored foreign or 
domestic firm, whichever receives the better treatment." The other 
obligation is that even if the measures are applied on a 
non-discriminatory basis, contracting parties should abstain from 
applying them "in a manner that adversely affects the trade of 
another party." Finally, a mechanism is provided for consultations 
among affected parties.
Some examples of these "non-prohibited" TRIMs are the 
requirement that some equity be held by nationals of the host 
country, restrictions on remittances and access to foreign 
exchange.
In recognition that the application of the agreement demands 
"significant adjustments," article III allows different transition 
periods for developed and developing countries.
The notion of "transparency" is addressed in article IV, by 
requiring that participants should "make public all measures of 
general application which are TRIMs or authorize the use of TRIMs." 
Also, the same article establishes the obligation of giving 
information about TRIMs that are applied to specific companies.
To conclude, a Committee would be created within GATT to 
oversee the implementation of the Agreement, according to the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the GATT.
As in the case of the proposals on services and agriculture, 
with the proposal on TRIMs, the U.S. delegation continues setting 
the agenda in the Uruguay Round. If approved, the proposed 
agreement will certainly represent a considerable task expansion
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that will place the GATT at the forefront of one of the most 
sensitive issues of the international economic agenda.
Gone seem to be the days when the legitimacy of the GATT was 
challenged on the grounds that it ignored international 
asymmetries, because its functioning rests on the assumption of 
formal equality among trading partners. The problem, defined by 
Ambassador Hills, is that "trade has outgrown the GATT," because 
there are "areas poorly covered by GATT rules, like agriculture, or 
not covered at all, like services, investment and intellectual 
property," that have become "of much greater importance than they 
once were." Today, with the debates within the Uruguay Round on 
issues such as services, intellectual property rights (IPRs) and 
TRIMs, the GATT appears as a dynamic institution, expanding its 
mandate into those new issues constitutive of the international 
economic agenda of the nineties.
III. 3. THE U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 1990 
(WDW/9/90 - 14 MARCH 1990)
As mandated in Section 1641 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act (1988 Trade Act), "the President shall submit 
to the Congress during each calendar year (but not later than March 
1) a report on A) the operation of the trade agreements program ... 
and B) the national trade policy agenda for the year in which the 
report is submitted." Both have been published by the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) in a single volume, released on 28 February 
1990.
The objectives included in this year's agenda are grouped 
under the following three headings:
"1) Strengthen and expand the international trading system by 
successfully negotiating an ambitious package of results in the 
Uruguay Round.
2) Complement Uruguay Round goals by conducting bilateral and 
regional market-opening and market-expanding initiatives.
3) Enforce and implement U.S. trade laws in the way that best 
advances the goals of open markets and fair trade."
Each one of these objectives is broken down into specific 
actions and initiatives in what amounts to a detailed description 
of the Administration's intentions in the field of international 
trade for 1990.
For instance, "the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
by December 1990" is described by the USTR Ambassador Carla Hills,
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as "the United states* highest trade priority." This entails the 
completion of agreements on the following issues:
-the reform of international agricultural trade by phasing out 
government intervention in the form of trade distorting subsidies 
and access barriers, as well as by harmonizing sanitary and 
phitosanitary regulations, "so that farmers can grow what they 
want, when they want, and earn a decent income without government 
interference;"
-increase market access for goods by significantly lowering 
tariff and nontariff barriers;
-establish rules governing trade in the "new areas" of 
services, intellectual property rights, and trade related 
investment measures;
-limit trade-distorting government subsidies; and
-increase the integration and responsibility of developing 
countries within the GATT system and limit trade restrictions 
justified on balance-of payments grounds.
Under "market-opening and market-expanding initiatives," to 
complement the Uruguay Round, actions are classified according to 
geographic and sectoral criteria.
The geographic initiatives comprise a very significant 
enumeration of bilateral and regional actions.
First listed is the Pacific Rim and within it the first 
objective is "to ensure that the Japanese market operates in an 
open, competitive fashion," by means of sectoral negotiations. 
Additionally, through the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) 
talks "the United States expects an interim assessment in spring 
1990 and both a 'blueprint* for concrete structural change and 
'down payment* of substantive first steps in July."
In East Asia, "intensive bilateral consultations and 
negotiations" with Korea and Taiwan are under way "to lower trade 
barriers in these countries," with the purpose of "increasing their 
responsibilities within the global trading system." Also, an ASEAN- 
US initiative is under study "to open markets and protect 
intellectual property rights." Finally, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation process, started in Canberra, Australia, in November 
1989, by . which the United States and 11 other countries, 
representing about one half of world trade, "strongly supported an 
ambitious, successful outcome for the Uruguay Round."
In North America, the first priority is the implementation of 
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Also, by contrast with 1989
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when it was listed as the first priority in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the other "North American" priority is the continuation 
of the Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks with Mexico.
In Europe and the Mediterranean, the Administration is 
"actively monitoring the EC 1992 project to ensure it does not 
result in new trade barriers at the EC's frontiers while it lowers 
them internally." Also, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the 
Administration "is taking several important steps to facilitate the 
movement...toward market-driven economies and open-trading 
regimes." Also, implementation of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement is mentioned as another priority.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Administration intends 
"to expand and improve" the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), as 
well as to grant to the Andean nations additional preferences under 
the GSP, to "orient their economies away from trade in drugs."
The sectoral priorities comprise the steel liberalization 
program, to eliminate subsidies and other trade distorting 
practices, as well as a shipbuilding initiative to eliminate 
subsidies and other forms of assistance to shipbuilders.
Finally, to promote "open markets and fair trade," the 
Administration indicates its disposition to use the instruments 
contained in the 1988 Trade Act, including super 301, special 301, 
telecommunications and "Buy America" provisions."
Briefly, for the Western Hemisphere, the main highlights 
contained in the U.S. trade strategy for 1990 are the inclusion of 
Mexico as a "North American" trading partner; the preferences 
granted to imports from the Andean nations; and in general, the 
absence of a policy encompassing all of Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
III. 4. FOREIGN BARRIERS TO U.S. EXPORTS (WDW/16/90 - 6 JUNE 1990)
The annual publication, by the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) of the National Trade Estimate Report describing the 
significant barriers confronted by U.S. exports in the markets of 
selected trading partners, usually passed almost unnoticed. This 
changed with the approval of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988, confirming not only that the Report had to be issued 
every year on March 30, but also that it should serve as the basis 
for the selection, one month later, of those countries that were to 
be submitted to scrutiny under the much dreaded "super" and 
"special" 301 provisions of the 1988 Trade Act.
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As it can be recalled, last year's Super 301 "hit list" 
included Brazil, India and Japan and six priority practices. This 
year, on April 27, Ambassador Carla A. Hills announced that the 
USTR was "not naming any new countries or practices as 'Super 301' 
priorities."
As a result of recent negotiations, Japan agreed to modify the 
three practices for which it was cited in last year's "hit list." 
Also, in recent months Japan agreed to further open its 
telecommunications market, as well as to provide greater protection 
for foreign sound recordings. Finally, as a result of the 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks (WDW/10/90 and 
WDW/12/90) Japan agreed, in Ambassador Hills' terms, "to dismantle 
a broad array of structural barriers to trade." For all these 
reasons, this time, it was judged "counterproductive" to initiate 
new Super 301 investigations against Japan.
In the case of Brazil, Ambassador Hills mentioned that the new 
Brazilian government "is in the process of embracing market-driven 
reforms that are his country's greatest economic hope." Besides, in 
April, Brazil dismantled the import licensing practices that had 
led to its inclusion in last year's "hit list." Consequently, 
Ambassador Hills declared that these actions resolved the U.S. 
concerns.
Only India remained in this year's list, because according to 
Ambassador Hills it had been "unresponsive" to repeated requests 
"to lower its barriers to insurance and investment," that led to 
its inclusion in last year's Super 301 list. Consequently, the 
deadline for completing the undergoing investigations begun last 
year on India's practices is still 16 June 1990.
Furthermore, no new priority countries were identified this 
year as subject to "Special 301" investigations on intellectual 
property rights. However, four countries were still placed in a 
Priority Watch List, among which Brazil is the only Latin American 
country, and nineteen other countries were placed in a Watch List, 
among which appear Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela.
Finally, the USTR decided that no countries could be 
identified as discriminating in their government procurement 
practices.
Still, the 1990 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 
Trade Barriers describes the barriers to U.S. exports existing in 
thirty five nations and two regional trading bodies, that together 
constitute the largest export markets for the United States. 
Unlisted countries were excluded because of the relatively small 
size of their markets or because no complaints were submitted 
against them by domestic producers. Six Latin American countries 
are listed: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela.
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The Report classifies trade barriers under the following eight 
categories: 1) import policies; 2) standards, testing labeling
and certification; 3) government procurement; 4) export subsidies;
5) lack of intellectual property protection; 6) services barriers;
7) investment barriers; and 8) other barriers that encompass more 
than one category or that affect a single sector.
For instance, Argentina is congratulated for the recent 
reforms undertaken to lower tariff rates to 30 percent ad valorem 
and to abolish the "buy national law. " It is criticized for lack of 
intellectual property protection of pharmaceutical products; 
barriers to insurance providers; and for levying a higher tax on 
soybean exports than on soybean oil and meal exports.
Brazil is criticized for its import licensing policies and its 
"buy national" government procurement practices; for several export 
subsidy programs of manufactured and processed agricultural 
products; lack of intellectual property protection for chemical 
compounds; several services barriers, particularly on insurance, 
data processing and motion pictures; and investment and other 
barriers remaining in the informatics sector, after the 
termination, on October 1989, of the 301 investigation.
Colombia's import policies are criticized despite recent 
reforms. Tariff levels are still high and because of import 
licensing, as well as some quantitative restrictions; for the 
granting of export subsidies, particularly of certificates rebating 
taxes on exports; for government procurement practices, such as the 
requirement of government-to-government contracts in several major 
public sector projects; for lack of intellectual property 
protection, because of deficiencies in patent law; for services 
barriers, requiring that at least half of import or export cargo be 
carried on Colombian flag ships; for those investment barriers that 
still remain, after the implementation of the Andean Pact's 
Decision 220; and for other barriers, such as pricing policies in 
the pharmaceutical sector.
Mexico is congratulated for its import policies, because its 
trade weighted average tariff has reached approximately 11 percent, 
considered "a significant achievement for a developing nation," as 
well as for the gradual elimination of import licensing permits and 
investment barriers. Mexico is criticized for its lack of 
intellectual property protection in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
alloys and foods; for its services barriers, particularly because 
ownership and operation of air, maritime and land transportation 
continues to be reserved to Mexican nationals.
Finally, Venezuela is congratulated for implementing a World 
Bank-IMF reform program that has led to reducing the maximum tariff 
from 135 to 80 percent and for the adoption of a timetable that 
will gradually bring down the maximum tariff to 20 percent by 1993. 
Other welcome changes anticipated as a result of the program are
the reduction of export subsidies, as well as perfectioning patent, 
trademark and copyright laws and liberalizing investment barriers.
III. 5. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL ON AGRICULTURE 
(WDW/31/90 - 31 OCTOBER 1990)
The four-year old Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
involving nearly 100 nations that represent more than 85 percent of 
world trade, was hailed originally as the negotiation to regulate 
more than $1 trillion out of almost $4 trillion of world trade in 
1990. It was launched to include traditional areas inadequately 
covered by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), such 
as agriculture, as well as new areas not covered at all, such as 
services, intellectual property rights and investment.
Less than five weeks before their scheduled completion in 
Brussels on 3-7 December, in what may become one of the major 
ironies of contemporary international economic relations, these 
forward-looking negotiations, in the terms of Ambassador Carla 
Hills, have found "a serious stumbling block" in agriculture, the 
most backward-looking sector of the industrialized economies.
On 19 September, addressing the European Parliament, 
Ambassador Hills made it very clear that "the importance of 
agricultural reform goes far beyond saving the billions lost in 
wasteful policies." She warned that, if there is no agreement on 
agriculture, "in all likelihood the Uruguay Round will collapse."
The issue is of such importance that other exporters of 
staples, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Canada, formed 
what is known as the Cairns Group, to support the impulse towards 
the reform of world agriculture within the GATT. Also, this issue 
has cut across the traditional split between North and South, with 
the United States leading the reformist group, among which appear 
numerous developing countries that are net exporters and even some 
net importers of food.
In this context, on 15 October, the United States submitted to 
the Uruguay Round a new proposal on agriculture, with three key 
elements: export subsidies, import access barriers, and internal 
support policies. The summary that follows reveals why in Geneva it 
has been baptized as the "90-75-75" proposal.
As agreed at the Houston Summit (WDW/21/90) , as well as by the 
July meeting of GATT's Trade Negotiating Committee, the U.S.
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proposal follows closely the draft text on agriculture prepared by 
the Dutch Chairman of the Agricultural Negotiating Group, Mr. Aart 
deZeeuw.
The objective of this new proposal is still "to begin the 
process of fundamental agricultural reform that will lead to a more 
fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system," in the form 
of specific reduction commitments by all countries and for all 
agricultural products, over a 10-year period beginning in 1991.
The key elements of the proposal are:
First, the reduction by 90 percent over 10 years of export 
subsidies of primary agricultural products, including differential 
export taxes. Also, export subsidies of processed agricultural 
products would be phased-out in six years. The accomplishment of 
this objective demands specific commitments on quantities exported, 
as well as on budget outlays for export subsidies.
Second, the conversion of all non-tariff import access 
barriers into bound tariffs, as well as the binding of all existing 
tariffs. The newly converted and the existing tariffs would be 
reduced by an average of 75 percent over 10 years, with a final 
ceiling rate that should not exceed 50 percent and a tariff 
snapback mechanism for the transition period, based either on a 
price-trigger or a quantity-trigger. Finally, depending on the 
level of income per capita, developing countries that are net 
importers of a commodity would be allowed a longer transition 
period, of up to 15 years, to implement these commitments.
Third, internal support policies, such as those directly 
linked to the production or price of a specific commodity, would be 
reduced by 75 percent over a period of ten years, with reduction 
commitments measured according to agreed indicators, called 
"aggregate measures of support (AMS)." Still, a wide array of 
policies would be available to implement national agricultural 
objectives, if and when they are designed in a way that produces 
minimal impacts on trade, such as income support, environmental 
protection, land conservation, domestic food aid, marketing, 
research and extension services.
Fourth, new rules would have to be agreed for the settlement 
of trade disputes involving sanitary and phitosanitary barriers.
The reactions were immediate among several participants. First 
and foremost, the Commission of the European Community 
counterproposed the adoption of an overall reduction of 30 percent 
in ten years. Unfortunately, this was so divisive that the 
decision-making instances of the Community were paralyzed and were 
unable to produce a decision. The stalemate was overtly recognized
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this week, with the postponement "sine die" of the next meeting of 
European Ministers of Agriculture, until there are more indications 
that a consensus can be reached.
On the other hand, almost fifty developing countries, led by 
Argentina, declared their intention to walk out of the 
negotiations, refusing agreement in all the other issues, until 
there is consensus on agriculture.
Thus, paradoxically, the most backward looking sector of the 
industrialized economies has become the major "stumbling block" 
against the progress of the most forward-looking trade 
negotiations.
IV. U.S.-JAPAN TENSION
IV. 1. U.S.-JAPAN SIT TALKS APPROACH CRUCIAL POINT 
(WDW/10/90 - 21 MARCH 1990)
The yen's weakness, the interest rate increases in Japan, or 
the strategic-technological marriage between Daimler-Benz and 
Mitsubishi, all of these have definitely not helped. Still, the 
largest contribution to disharmony between the United States and 
Japan comes from trade relations.
This time, the epicenter is located in one of the three trade 
negotiating instances that are simultaneously under way between 
Japan and the United States. The first is the Uruguay Round, mainly 
concentrated on the new areas uncovered by the multilateral, GATT 
framework. The second takes the form of negotiations on specific 
products, such as telecommunications, construction services, forest 
products, supercomputers, semiconductors and satellites. Finally, 
the flare was ignited by the U.S. frustration with the meager 
results generated thus far by the third negotiating instance, the 
so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks.
This "unique bilateral undertaking" was launched in July of *
1989, precisely, to avoid the weariness of the product-by-product 
approach, by focusing on the "structural" obstacles held 
responsible both by the United States and Japan for the obstinate 
trade imbalance that prevails among them.
In the terms of the Deputy United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) , S. Lynn Williams, the SII talks are an "iterative and 
mutual" process, without "set patterns and or benchmarks." Better
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still, as President Bush said, "let's face it, these talks are a 
two way street."
On the table are the following Japanese "structural" barriers 
to imports, as identified by the United States: savings and
investment policies; land use policies; the distribution system; 
exclusionary business practices; pricing mechanisms; and cross­
shareholding arrangements, known in Japan as financial "keiretsu." 
For its part, Japan identified the following "structural" 
shortcomings contributing to the loss of U.S. competitiveness: low 
savings ratio, as well as low investment in education and in 
research and development.
The first two rounds of the SII talks were held in 1989. The 
third, scheduled for January 1990, was expected to deal with 
"concrete, detailed proposals." Nonetheless, the coming elections 
led the Japanese government to request a postponement, until 22-23 
February. The results of this last round were disappointing for the 
United States and therein lies the immediate cause of the present 
crisis.
Frustration with the results of the third round of SII talks 
led President Bush to invite recently elected Prime Minister Kaifu 
to a hastily arranged, two-day "summit in the sun," held on 
Saturday 3 March, at the Morningside Country Club, surrounded by 
the San Jacinto Mountains of Palm Springs, California. Only two 
weeks before, Prime Minister Kaifu had won what was seen as "a 
surprisingly strong victory in a parliamentary election." The 
weekend summit was squeezed between Prime Minister Kaifu's 
inaugural speech to the Diet, delivered on Thursday, and the 
session to answer questions set for the following Monday.
The results of the summit were described as positive and 
friendly, with the President and the Prime Minister addressing each 
other, after three and a half hours of meetings and two meals, as 
"George" and "Toshiki."
Prime Minister Kaifu declared that he was "determined to 
firmly tackle structural reforms... as one of the top priorities." 
Furthermore, a Japanese spokesman said that the Prime Minister had 
felt "a sense of urgency" on trade issues. Finally, both leaders 
encouraged their respective negotiating teams to "redouble their 
efforts to achieve meaningful results."
A week later, Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher visited 
Japan to convey this "sense of urgency about the trade problem." To 
emphasize it, while Secretary Mosbacher was in Japan, U.S. 
negotiators declared that they were halting talks about satellite 
sales, until the Japanese present "constructive and productive" 
proposals. The reason for the suspension of the talks was better 
depicted by somebody who was quoted only as a "U.S. official." He 
said, "we were dancing in circles. No matter how much we liked our
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dancing partner, we were getting no closer to the destination and 
the music was running out. We were getting nowhere."
The music was in fact running out. The fourth round of the SII 
talks, set for April 2 and 3 in Washington, has to produce an 
interim "progress report." Additionally, the recently released U.S. 
trade policy agenda for 1990 (WDW/9/90) , asserts that at the
conclusion of the SII talks, by July, the United States expects 
"both a 'blueprint' for concrete structural change and 'down 
payment' of substantive first steps.”
To deal with what Foreign Minister Nakayama depicted as this 
"hair-trigger situation," the Japanese cabinet, only this week, 
decided to undertake "crisis management of U.S.-Japan ties," by 
approving a list of concessions to be presented to the next SII 
April meeting in Washington. The list will contain the following 
actions:
-Relaxation of Japan's Large Scale Store Act, shortening the 
waiting period to open a new store from up to ten years to less 
than two years.
-To increase spending in infrastructure, roads parks and other 
amenities, although due to the resistance from Minister of Finance 
Rytaro Hashimoto, it remains to be seen if the target of ten 
percent of GNP requested by the United States will be met.
-To increase the penalties for monopoly behavior and to 
strengthen the Fair Trade Commission, charged with enforcing 
Japan's Anti-Monopoly Act.
-To bring down the price of land in Tokyo, by the abolition of 
the tax break for urban farmland.
-Finally, at least in two of the three sectoral issues 
submitted to "Super 301," concessions will be offered on the 
purchase of U.S.-made communications satellites, as well as on 
increased purchases of supercomputers, while no accommodation will 
be offered on imports of U.S. forest products.
Thus, apparently the time has come when it will be known if, 
as stated by the USTR Ambassador Carla Hills, the Japanese "will 
risk killing the goose that laid the golden eggs."
r
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IV. 2. THE NIKKEI SINKS (WDW/11/90 - 28 MARCH 1990)
There are strong indications that, as 1989 was the year when 
the Berlin Wall crumbled, 1990 will be known by the tumbling of 
Tokyo's apparently unbeatable Nikkei Stock Average.
On Monday, March 20, Tokyo's stock market opened to what 
became one of the most hectic and panic-ridden sessions on record. 
At closing time, the mighty Nikkei had plunged 4.1 percent, its 
third worst slide since the worldwide crash of Black Monday, in 
October 1987.
On Tuesday's morning session, once again, the Nikkei was down 
0.5 percent, despite the Bank of Japan's announced decision to 
boost the discount rate for the fourth time in a year, by a full 
percentage point to 5.25 percent. Even so, at closing time, the 
Nikkei was down 1.5 percent, thus reaching its lowest level 
amounting to a cumulative drop of 21 percent throughout the year.
On Thursday, the Nikkei experienced one of its most volatile 
performances, with a nosedive of more than 1600 points in one hour, 
to close with a loss of 3.1 percent.
By the end of the week, coinciding with Friday's San Francisco 
meeting between Secretary Brady and Minister Hashimoto, the 
battered Nikkei stood at 29,843.34 yen, 25.5 percent below its late 
December all-time high and quite far from the 31,500 level, 
considered by technical analysts as the starting point of a long­
term "bear market."
In a week, "the highest flying market in the world, a symbol 
of Japan's financial power and an engine for its massive investment 
at home and abroad," experienced a staggering loss of one hundred 
trillion yen.
One of the best illustrations of the magnitude of the losses, 
can be found in the value of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. 
(NTT) shares. Since the giant communications firm was privatized, 
its stocks were a symbol of Tokyo's "unsinkable" market. During 
Thursday's panic they went from a peak of $21,000 per share in 1987 
to a low of $6,839. Thus, when this symbol fell below its original 
selling price of $7,742, investors understood that something had 
changed in the outlook of the Japanese economy.
The search for the culprit did not make itself wait and it was 
found primarily in the dollar-yen exchange rate. As The Wall Street 
Journal editorialized about "the nervous Nikkei," a decline of 20 
percent in the Dow Jones Industrial Average "would make Americans 
nervous too. But such shocks are an inevitable consequence of 
exchange-rate manipulations."
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The yen has been falling and Japanese authorities appear 
unable to arrest the drop. In this year only, despite massive 
efforts by the Bank of Japan, the yen has fallen more than 8 
percent against the dollar. During the week when the Tokyo stock 
exchange was plunging, the yen soared past 155 to the dollar, to a 
38-month low. Obviously, this does not augur well for the prospect 
of correcting the stubborn Japanese trade surplus, neither does it 
contribute to the harmonious progression of the undergoing 
Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) talks (WDW/10/90) with the 
United States.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Bank of Japan's reaction 
to the stock market's volatility, by increasing the discount rate, 
what appears adequate to deal with one issue may be 
counterproductive to deal with another issue. The increase in 
interest rates, aimed at stopping the yen's decline, will also 
discourage stock purchases and make fixed-income investments more 
attractive, as well as hurt corporate earnings by slowing economic 
growth.
These perceptions were not dispelled by the outcome of the 
conversations between Secretary Brady and Minister Hashimoto. A 
''senior U.S. official" said, even before the meeting started, that 
there were "no plans at the moment" to issue "statements aimed at 
calming the Japanese markets." The yen's fall was characterized by 
the same official as "a domestic Japanese issue."
Additionally, there are also indications that the resilient 
Japanese trade surplus might be beginning to dwindle, although at 
a slower pace with the United States. For instance, just this past 
January, Japan posted its first current account deficit since 1982 
and even the United States reported that its trade deficit with 
Japan had fallen to $2.9 billion, the lowest monthly figure since 
1984. Also, Japanese imports from the United States doubled from 
$22.6 billion in 1985 to 44.6 billion in 1989. In all, Japan's 
trade surplus has declined steadily from 4.5 percent of GNP to 1.9 
percent.
To overcast even more the outlook of the Japanese economy, 
certain cracks have burst open in the otherwise disciplined 
Japanese economic decision-making team. One of the most poignant is 
the confrontation, at times unusually public and acrimonious, 
between the Bank of Japan and the Finance Ministry about increasing 
interest rates. The Bank of Japan has been publicly criticized for 
taking too long in increasing interest rates and lagging behind 
West Germany.
But even more ominous is the linkage between low interest 
rates and the boom in land prices, fueled by a discount rate kept, 
from 1985 until last May, at a historic low of 2.5 percent. Highly 
valued land-holdings have allowed Japanese corporations to raise
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capital with relative ease and have allowed investors to borrow 
against their land to invest in the stock market.
These linkages between land values and the stock market raise 
anxieties because there is the possibility that land prices might 
tumble as stocks did, because land prices have sky-rocketed as much 
as stocks. For instance, according to the Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan, the 1988 value of land in Japan at $15 trillion was five 
times that of the United States. This has raised fears in Japan of 
land values fueling "inflationary psychology," as well as of 
prospects of social polarization between those who own land and 
those who do not. No wonder, one of the complaints voiced by the 
U.S. delegation in the SII talks is that land values in Japan have 
become a barrier to trade and investment.
For all these reasons, that last Monday was the second best 
day ever for Tokyo's stock market, defying the falling yen and 
soaring 4.8 percent, has not made analysts sure that the market had 
touched bottom. Confirming this apprehension, on Tuesday, March 27, 
the Nikkei continued falling and on the morning session of 
Wednesday, 28 March, the Nikkei fell again 1.62 percent, while the 
dollar was rapidly approaching 160 yen.
The worry now is that the Nikkei's fall is more than the 
"bursting of a speculative bubble," or as depicted by a "senior 
Bank of Japan official," on Monday when it all began, "a kind of 
adjustment or correction, a little bit larger than expected."
The fear is that, as evidenced by the falling yen, the magic 
side of economic policy has been punctured, that the confidence in 
the robustness of the Japanese economy has been hurt.
IV. 3. THE U.S.-JAPAN SII TALKS INTERIM REPORT 
(WDW/12/90 - 9 MAY 1990)
Skepticals that still doubt if the relations between Japan and 
the United States have become the "relationship of major tension" 
of the present international economic system are advised to examine 
in detail the interim report issued, on April 5 in Washington, at 
the conclusion of the last round of the Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII) talks (WDW/10/90).
The report should also be mandatory reading for those 
interested in finding out the scope and extent that is necessary 
today for the management of economic interdependence, among two 
trading partners of the size and relative weight of the United 
States and Japan. As recalled recently by the Deputy U.S.T.R., 
Ambassador S. Lynn Williams, together, these two countries
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represent more than one third of the world's GNP and account for 
more than one fourth of total world exports, with the U.S. as the 
world's largest exporter and Japan as the third largest.
The scope of the SII talks can be illustrated by focusing on 
each one of the "structural problems" placed on the negotiating 
table by each partner.
On one side, the United States identified the following areas 
of the Japanese economy: 1) savings and investment patterns; 2) 
land use; 3) distribution system; 4) exclusionary business 
practices; 5) business groupings or "keiretsu" relationships; and
6) pricing mechanisms.
On the other side, Japan identified the following areas of the 
U.S. economy: 1) savings and investment patterns; 2) corporate
investment activities and supply capacity; 3) corporate behavior;
4) government regulations; 5) research and development; 6) export 
promotion; and 7) workforce training and education.
This wide-ranging and penetrating agenda only confirms why the 
SII talks were characterized, by the White House Press Secretary, 
as "unique in the history of bilateral trade and economic 
discussions." Rarely, if ever, have such intimate structural 
characteristics been subject to negotiation among trading partners. 
In the end, this only reveals the profound interdependence attained 
among these economies, which has led, in the terms of Ambassador 
Williams, to the point that "one needs to look at everything in 
order to solve anything."
The extent of the talks can be illustrated by describing some 
of the mutual admissions and concessions granted by each partner in 
each one of the items of the agenda.
For instance, in the area of savings and investment, Japan 
made a commitment to increase substantially investment in 
infrastructure, by formulating "a new comprehensive plan of public 
investment for the coming ten years." Also, to encourage 
consumption in the private sector, the Japanese government, 
starting this April, will launch a trial of 40 hour weeks for 
government employees on shift work schedules, as a first step in 
the direction of the establishment of 5 day weeks for all 
government employees.
For its part, the United States signaled the reduction of its 
federal budget deficit as a top priority, as well as to accelerate 
the recent upward trend in the savings ratio of individuals.
On land use, the Japanese government committed itself to 
undertake a comprehensive review of land taxation systems, 
particularly of the deferment system of payment of the inheritance 
tax and the fixed assets tax on the agricultural land available in
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the major metropolitan areas, aiming at implementation from fiscal 
year 1992.
In the area of corporate behavior, the U.S. Treasury created 
a working group on savings and the cost of capital, as part of a 
comprehensive effort to foster a long-term investment horizon among 
corporate managers. Among the factors that will be reviewed is the 
influence of compensation packages on the time horizons of 
executives and other employees.
On the distribution system, the Japanese government promised 
to improve harbors and import-related infrastructures, as well as 
to expedite import procedures, to attain one-day customs clearance 
by contrast with the present three days. Also, the large-scale 
retail store law will be reformed, to facilitate the opening of new 
stores, shortening the procedures of approval to less than one and 
a half years and allowing more space for import sales, as well as 
by relaxing the regulations on closing time, "from after six 
o'clock p.m. to after seven o'clock p.m."
The United States agreed to eliminate certain government 
regulations that discourage international trade and competition, 
such as a relaxation of procedures within the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), given the 
changing strategic situation, as well as the elimination of many 
export controls on energy exports.
In the area of exclusive business practices, the Japanese 
government agreed to enforce more vigorously anti-trust 
legislation, by means such as increasing the number of personnel of 
its Fair Trade Commission, the establishment of an Ombudsman system 
and by resorting to more criminal penalties.
The United States confirmed its plans to advance research and 
development in both the private and the public sectors, by means of 
increasing budgetary allocations, the establishment of the position 
of Undersecretary for Technology at the Commerce Department and by 
making permanent the present research and experimentation credit to 
firms that qualify.
On the issue of "business groupings," or "keiretsu," the 
Japanese government agreed to liberalize its foreign investment 
regime and to review disclosure rules of substantial ownership in 
shares.
The United States government holds in high priority the 
promotion of exports by means of implementing a special program 
aimed specifically at Japan.
In the area of prices, the "unreasonable price differentials" 
that exist in Japan between domestic and overseas markets will be 
closely monitored, as a "barometer of success in eliminating
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structural barriers," by means of the continuous implementation of 
surveys and the dissemination of information to consumers and 
industries.
Finally, as a means to enhance competitiveness, the need was 
recognized to improve the education and training of the United 
States workforce, by means of increased budgetary allocations to 
strengthen education systems in mathematics and science.
Several conclusions may be drawn from this list of mutual 
concessions, although there still remains to be seen how powerful 
the contribution of the agreed measures will be to the closing of 
the obstinate trade gap that persists among these two economic 
giants.
Apparently, just by their timing, the results were sufficient 
to arrest the mounting protectionist pressures in the U.S. 
Congress. Once again, the rituals of commercial policy have 
momentarily deterred protectionist urgings, allowing for the more 
enduring effects of macroeconomic policies to make their 
contribution.
Thus, at least, an escalation in the confrontation between 
these giants was prevented, because the U.S.T.R., Ambassador Carla 
Hills decreed, what was immediately judged as a cease fire, that 
Japan would not be included in this year's Super 301 hit list. 
Additionally, several outstanding bilateral issues were also 
settled between Japan and the United States, such as steel and 
textiles, telecommunications, supercomputers, satellites and wood 
products. In the final analysis, these immediate results can be 
credited to what in Japanese is known as "gaiatsu," or to the role 
played by foreign influence in domestic politics.
IV. 4. "HAPPY ENDING" IN THE U.S.-JAPAN SII TALKS 
(WDW/20/90 - 11 JULY 1990)
There seems to be consensus that the "Achilles' heel" that led 
to the demise of the Bretton Woods framework of multilateral *
financial arrangements was the inability to deal with surpluses. By 
contrast, dealing with deficits, particularly with those of the %
less influential actors of the present international financial 
system, was relatively easier.
The recent conclusion, on June 28 after a four day marathon in 
Tokyo, of the ongoing saga known as the structural Impediment 
Initiative (SII) Talks (WDW/10 and 12/90), between Japan and the
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United States, has evidenced that the two economic giants of the 
present international economic system still prefer to deal with 
such issues bilaterally.
This "unprecedented cooperative effort" to deal with the 
obstinate trade surplus exhibited by Japan ended, on schedule just 
before the Houston summit, with the approval of a joint report. 
This "historic document" includes Japanese and U.S. commitments, as 
well as an agreement to establish "an open, flexible follow-up 
process, which will include regular meetings, a review of progress, 
and an annual report with a joint press release."
The President of the United States immediately welcomed "the 
clear commitment by Japan to reduce further its current account 
surplus," indicating that the SII process is "an important 
framework in which the underlying causes of trade imbalances can be 
removed." Nonetheless, President Bush also recalled that "removing 
structural impediments is a two-way street," because "as Japan 
tackles its structural problems, so must the United States."
Japanese commitments include: the levels of public investment; 
land use; distribution; exclusionary business practices; formal and 
informal ties among companies ("keiretsu") ; and pricing mechanisms. 
U.S. commitments include: saving and investment patterns;
competitiveness; corporate behavior; government deregulation; 
research and development; and workforce training and education.
These are the same areas that appeared in the Interim Report 
approved last April, but without the details that are included in 
the final report.
For instance, the most difficult issue — almost mirroring a 
typical discussion between the IMF and a deficit country—  was 
Japanese spending in public works. The United States initially 
wanted a promise of increases, in terms of a specific percentage of 
GNP. In the end, a global figure was accepted, amounting to almost 
$3 trillion in the next ten years, of which $2.8 trillion in public 
expenditures and $100 billion from two recently privatized 
companies, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone and Japan Railways. This 
figure represents an increase of 63 percent over the next ten years 
in Japan's public expenditures in housing, airports, ports, parks 
and sewers.
On the reduction of the U.S. fiscal deficit, Deputy Trade 
Representative L. Williams declared that the SII talks had been "an 
important influence" in the decision to raise taxes, announced by 
President Bush the day before the SII talks' conclusion. This 
action was said to have proved to the Japanese that the United 
States is "serious" about deficit reduction, which they see as a 
crucial requirement for the reduction of U.S. dependence on foreign 
capital.
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Another area where mutual concessions were exchanged was on 
the follow-up mechanism that was finally agreed. Originally, the 
Japanese resisted the creation of the mechanism. By the end, a 
Japanese spokesman said the U.S. proposal had been accepted, on the 
condition that no new issues be taken up in the follow-up meetings 
and that these should take place no more than twice a year. From 
the U.S. perspective, as described by Commerce Undersecretary for 
International Trade, Michael Farren, the follow-up mechanism will 
not take up new areas of friction, "only in the context of the 
ideas" that are already included in the final report. "We can raise 
issues," declared Mr. Farren, "as they become relevant to other 
sectors."
The final agreement on the follow-up mechanism says that 
progress will be reviewed on the "issues identified in the Final 
Report;" but other ^matters relevant to problem areas already 
identified in the SII talks" can be discussed as well; and "in the 
spring of each year a written report" will be examined, "on the 
progress made by each country toward solving its structural
problems," both reports will be reviewed together and a joint press 
release will be issued. Finally, there was agreement on preserving 
the SII process indefinitely, with annual meetings and joint
reports at least for the next three years. In this manner, the SII 
talks between these two giants have become a permanent feature of 
U.S.-Japan economic interdependence.
To conclude, besides the positive statements with which
President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu greeted the outcome, some 
skeptical reactions immediately appeared. From the U.S. Congress 
came the conclusion that the "bottom line" should be sought in the 
agreement's impact on the stubborn U.S. trade deficit with Japan. 
The powerful chairman of the Finance Committee, Senator Lloyd 
Bentsen (D-Texas), declared "the worth of the agreement can only be 
measured by hard results. In that sense, the jury is still out."
By contrast, in Japan some reactions were bitter-sweet. For 
instance, the managing editor of the daily Tokvo Shimbun. Mr. 
Tsuyoshi Sato, in an op-ed published in The Journal of 
Commerce.recalled that this was "the third crisis in modern 
Japanese history precipitated by American pressure." The first was 
the forceful end of Japanese seclusion in the 1850s, by U.S.
Commodore Matthew Perry. The second was the transformation of 
Japan, after "the Pacific War," by the directives of General 
Douglas MacArthur. And the third was the "blueprint for 
restructuring the Japanese economy," by President George Bush.
In this last respect, on one hand, Mr. Sato admits that "no 
independent country has ever received from another government such 
a detailed agenda for domestic reform." Even if he considers this 
"a national disgrace," Mr. Sato acknowledges that "changes in 
response to U.S. demands will hurt the Japanese bureaucracy and 
certain business sectors," while "consumers stand to benefit in
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many ways." Mr. Sato concludes with the rather joyful assertion 
that it would be "wonderful if famous shops in New York, London and 
Paris could sell their brand-name items in Tokyo at reasonable 
prices."
V. INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
V. 1. WHITHER LATIN AMERICA? (WDW/7/90 - 28 FEBRUARY 1990)
It has become a cliche that the "galloping changes" that are 
taking place in Europe will result in a diversion of financial 
resources, otherwise destined to the developing world. Recently, 
the President of the Inter American Economic and Social Council 
(IA-ECOSOC), Ambassador Eladio Knipping, from the Dominican 
Republic, declared that "the explosion of liberty and freedom in 
the East of Europe, that is very laudable, cannot be a pretext for 
the industrialized nations and the financing organisms to relegate 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries."
Such statements, support a number of rather somber scenarios 
that have been recently depicted in the United States about the 
future of its relations with Latin America.
Some of these predictions announce "a new dark age for Latin 
America;" or that there will be no "new hemispheric pact," because 
"no Latin American country, save one, will be of sufficient value 
or interest" for the United States; or "a two-tiered" approach, 
leading to special bilateral relationships between the United 
States and Mexico or Brazil, while the rest is managed through 
multilateral channels.
Although it must be sheer coincidence, these scenarios have 
been produced by scholars affiliated to some of the most respected 
conservative think-tanks. For instance, the author of the "dark 
age" prediction is Mr. David Ronfeldt, a political scientist with 
the Rand Corporation. The author of Latin America's loss of value 
and interest is Mr. Mark Falcoff, a resident fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI). Finally, the proponent of the "two- 
tiered approach" is Mr. Georges A. Fauriol, Senior Fellow and 
Director of the Latin American Program at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS).
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Instead of the common belief that a multipolar international 
system and the relaxation of U.S.-Soviet tension benefits Latin 
America, in the forthcoming issue of Hemisphere. Mr. Ronfeldt sees 
a somber future. It is characterized by "the failure of democracy 
and a plunge into a new dark age," of unrestrained "violence and 
chaos under a new generation of dictators."
Weakened by economic stagnation and by the resurgence of 
skepticism about the "superiority of democracy," in most Latin 
American countries, "dictators and demagogues will take over— some 
through elections, others through force." Nonetheless, rather than 
another "cyclical return to military regimes," Mr. Ronfeldt asserts 
that "something deeper will be happening: the rise of a new
generation of Caudillos who prefer corporatism to democracy."
Three trends are identified as contributing to this "dark 
age." First, "the continued disengagement of the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. from conflict in Latin America." Second, the rejection 
by Latin American leaders of "the old pan-American vision," to be 
replaced by a "two-Americas" vision. And third, "ideology would 
decline while racism, regionalism and religion would increase as 
motives for violence."
The conclusion derived from this bleak scenario is that U.S. 
policy should avoid getting entangled in "dark age" conflicts and 
it should better concentrate on North America's development, 
including Mexico and Canada.
The main outcome of the end of the Cold War in Latin America 
is described by Mr. Falcoff in the first issue of the AEI's The 
American Enterprise. In this scenario, "Washington will be free to 
disengage from the region," on account of some "unacknowledged 
changes" that have "altered the regional environment."
The first of these changes is that most of the Latin American 
countries are "substantially non-aligned. . .they are no longer 
politico-military allies of the United States, but are neutrals."
The second change is considered "a bigger challenge to the old 
system." This is called "the decline of economic complementarity," 
by which "Latin America's relative importance to the United States 
has been steadily dropping for many years." To illustrate this 
point, it is recalled that Latin America's share in total U.S. 
direct investment dropped from 19.1 percent in 1965 to 12.7 percent 
in 1985. Another indicator mentioned is the decrease in U.S. 
dependence from Latin American imports, from 17.3 percent of total 
U.S. imports in 1965 to 12.6 percent in 1985.
From these indicators Mr. Falcoff derives the conclusion that 
only Mexico deserves U.S. attention, because of its sharing of a 
common border. Even so, "Latin America will continue to affect the 
United States in ways that can only be described as problematic,
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particularly in their export of drugs or illegal immigrants." Thus, 
for the rest of Latin America, Mr. Falcoff prescribes that "each 
will have to cut its own deal with the United States (and the rest 
of the world) as best it can."
Finally, less pessimistic but basically in the same direction 
is Mr. Fauriol's "two-tiered approach"— published in the last issue 
of Foreign Affairs. He does not see a decline in the relative 
importance of the region. On the contrary, "for all its current 
problems," he asserts that "Latin America will remain a source of 
U.S. economic interest as it has for more than a century. The 
region's political and security proclivities and manifold 
development problems will ensure the existence of a unique 
relationship."
As a result of "global restructuring," Mr. Fauriol sees the 
emergence "of a new inter-American state system predicated on the 
concept of a two- or three-tiered 'American Community.'" With the 
result that "such a community would displace the notion of a 
single-hemisphere partnership and replace it with a series of 
subregional compacts adapting to varying hemispheric situations."
Some of these "compacts" are briefly sketched. "Among several 
possible configurations, Washington is likely to draw the most 
interest from those countries that are closest to it 
geographically, economically and socially. In its broadest 
framework, that scenario could evolve into a U.S.-Canada-Mexico 
North American free trade area with its attendant political 
implications." Also, as a complement, "a two-tiered structure is 
evident in U.S. policymaking and is already in place regarding 
Mexico; it could apply to Brazil as well."
In this context of "distinct bilateral relations" that "assure 
continued U.S. involvement in the region by providing strong 
strategic policy anchors," Mr. Fauriol suggests that the rest of 
the relations between the United States and Latin America "may 
evolve along multilateral lines, and force more attention on common 
agendas (drugs, the environment, technology) and effective regional 
and subregional institutions that address those issues."
V. 2. TOWARDS A MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AREA 
(WDW/17/90 - 20 JUNE 1990)
Preceded by the signature, only a week before, of an extension 
of the "social pact" between workers, business and government, that 
has sustained the adjustment and stabilization of the Mexican 
economy, on June 10, President Carlos Salinas initiated his second 
state visit to Washington.
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The expected highlight of this second visit was the agreement 
authorizing negotiators to begin discussions on the establishment 
of a free trade area between the United States and Mexico.
As prescribed by Section 1102 (c) of the 1988 Trade Act, the 
United States can enter into negotiations only if this is requested 
by the foreign government. Previously, on May 22, President Salinas 
had accepted a recommendation from the Mexican Senate to undertake 
such negotiations, citing as reasons "Mexico's geographical 
location, history of trade relations and the complementary relation 
with the U.S. economy."
Expressing a "commitment to forge a vigorous partnership for 
sustained economic growth and opportunity," in a Joint Statement 
issued on June 11, Presidents Bush and Salinas "determined that a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement is the best vehicle to achieve 
these ambitious objectives." Consequently, they "directed 
Ambassador Carla Hills, the United States Trade Representative, and 
Dr. Jaime Sierra Puche, the Minister of Commerce and Industrial 
Development of Mexico, to undertake the consultations and 
preparatory work needed to initiate such negotiations.11 
Additionally, the negotiators were asked to report back to the 
Presidents "as soon as practicable, but in any event before their 
next meeting," to be held in Monterrey, Mexico, next December.
According to the Joint Statement, the agreement should 
include: 1) the gradual and comprehensive elimination of trade
barriers, including the "full, phased elimination of import 
tariffs;" 2) the elimination or fullest possible reduction of non­
tariff barriers; 3) the establishment of clear, binding protection 
for intellectual property rights; and 4) means to improve and 
expand the flow of goods, services and investment.
The evidence indicates that the decision to establish a free 
trade area among Mexico and the United States basically constitutes 
the formalization of the intense, wide and deep levels of economic 
interdependence that already exist among these trading partners.
As stated by Ambassador Hills, only three days after the Joint 
Statement, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
Ways and Means Committee of the House, Mexico is the U.S. "third 
single largest trading partner." Two-way trade amounted in 1989 to 
$52 billion, with $25 billion corresponding to U.S. exports and 
$27.2 billion to Mexican exports.
Furthermore, in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico is the 
most important U.S. trading partner. In 1988, out of a total of 
$53.7 billion imported by the United States from the region, almost 
half, $23.5 billion, came from Mexico. Moreover, in the same year, 
more than half of these imports entered the United States under 
preferential treatment, of which $10.8 billion through what was 
previously known as the 806/7 program ("maquila"), as well as $2.2
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billion under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) . Finally, 
as mentioned by Ambassador Hills, United States investment in 
Mexico amounts to $5.5 billion, or 62 percent of all foreign direct 
investment, while almost two thirds of Mexico's foreign trade is 
with the United States.
Perhaps because of this profound and pervasive asymmetry in 
the relations between Mexico and the United States the accepted 
wisdom, with some remarkable exceptions such as Professor Sidney 
Weintraub's "marriage of convenience," was that Mexico would reject 
an invitation to participate in any kind of global free trade 
agreement with the United States.
Nonetheless, as an indication of how commonly held perceptions 
are crumbling in today's international economy, in a reversal 
called "ironic" by Robert Pastor, the skepticism and the 
willingness have switched camps.
Just a few days before President Salinas' visit to Washington, 
the U.S. press revealed that there was a split within the 
Administration about the "timing" more than about the "wisdom" of 
an eventual free trade agreement with Mexico.
On the side of the skepticals, having in mind the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round in December, appears none other than 
Ambassador Carla Hills herself, as well as Secretary of Agriculture 
Clayton Yeutter. Ambassador Hills went as far as to state, during 
a question and answer period at a National Press Club luncheon on 
May 24, that "there is not going to be any immediate negotiations," 
because of a crowded legislative calendar. Also joining the ranks 
of the skepticals was House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski (D-Ill.)
On the other side, the group of those in favor of moving 
quickly, called "the Texans," is just as, if not more, formidable, 
it includes Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Commerce 
Mosbacher and the powerful Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd 
Bentsen (D-Tex.)
The wording of the Joint Statement reveals that, to the 
satisfaction of the skepticals, no formal negotiations were 
announced, which would have entailed requesting authorization from 
the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless, the negotiators were instructed "to 
undertake the consultations and preparatory work needed to 
initiate" formal negotiations, after the expected conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in December of this year.
Furthermore, strong opposition was voiced in the United States 
by the executive council of the powerful AFL-CIO, because "a free 
trade agreement will only encourage greater capital outflows from 
the United States and bring about an increase in imports from 
Mexico . . .  it will also do little to improve the lives of Mexican
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workers." By contrast, the Business Roundtable, a powerful group of 
corporate leaders chaired by James Robinson III, the American 
Express CEO, reportedly "endorsed a free-trade agreement in glowing 
terms."
No immediate reactions from Latin America and the Caribbean 
were reported in the U.S. press, although perhaps in anticipation, 
on June 4 in Asuncion, Paraguay, Ambassador Carla Hills solemnly 
announced to the General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) , a "new hemispheric partnership" that "seeks to expand 
trade within the region, looking toward a hemispheric zone of open 
trade." Also, this past week, Secretary of Commerce Robert 
Mosbacher initiated a trade mission to Chile and Brazil.
V. 3. ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS (WDW/19/90 - 4 JULY 1990)
Amidst a loud uproar generated by the major departure from his 
most salient campaign promise of "no new taxes," last Wednesday, 
President Bush outlined a package of economic measures under the 
heading of "Enterprise for the Americas." In the characteristic 
decision-making style of the present Administration, the 
presentation was put together somewhat hurriedly and surprised many 
observers.
The timing was intriguing, particularly because it was known 
that the Administration was undertaking a major revision of its 
Latin American policies, in anticipation of President Bush's 
announced visit to South America in September.
As explained by a "senior official," the purpose was to focus 
attention on Latin America before the Houston summit, to balance 
the emphasis that will receive the emerging European order. It was 
also seen as helping to ease some of the concerns that Latin 
America and the Caribbean would be forgotten. As Secretary Brady 
said, meeting with reporters later, "as Eastern Europe has 
undergone a dramatic political and economic reform effort, a 
quieter but equally dramatic revolution has occurred in Latin 
America and the Caribbean."
Finally, some congressional critics immediately pointed to a 
domestic political reason for the announcement, as a means to 
deflect some of the controversy unleashed by the decision to raise 
taxes, trying to remove it from the front pages.
The initiative rests on three substantive pillars and one 
institutional dimension. It deals with debt, investment and trade, 
placing the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) at the center of 
the first two, where the proposal exhibits its most concrete
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elements. Although the commercial aspects are relatively less 
defined, it is here that some observers have found the greatest 
potential.
On the side of debt and investment, dimension seems to be 
directly proportionate to concreteness. For instance, it addresses 
what is recognized as "the growing problem of official debt," by 
proposing "legislation to permit substantial reduction and 
restructuring of existing U.S. concessional loans (including AID 
and PL-480 claims) to Latin American and Caribbean countries with 
serious debt servicing difficulties." The amount that will be 
covered is $7 billion of concessional loans, out of the $12 billion 
of total official debt owed to the U.S. government. This amount is 
evidently small, although as pointed by President Bush, "in many 
cases, the heaviest official debt burdens fall on some of the 
region's smallest nations — countries like Honduras, El Salvador, 
Jamaica." Furthermore, the IDB is asked to "become an additional 
source of enhancements under the existing debt strategy," together 
with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , "to 
back specific transactions negotiated by Latin American and 
Caribbean countries with their commercial banks."
On investment, the proposal covers several fronts. First, "a 
new investment sector loan program" to support privatization 
efforts and the liberalization of investment regimes. The IDB is 
also given the responsibility of carrying out this program, in 
conjunction with the World Bank. Second, a multilateral investment 
fund, administered by the IDB as well, "to advance comprehensive 
investment reforms." This fund would provide grants of "up to $300 
million annually," with the U.S. pledging $100 million and seeking 
to obtain matching contributions from Japan and Europe.
Finally, the proposal on trade is as forward looking, as it is 
broadly defined, although perhaps for this reason here the 
initiative exhibits the greatest potential. As described, "it sets 
forth a vision and a challenge" to Latin America and the Caribbean.
First, the long term goal is described as "a free trade zone 
stretching from the port of Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego." Second, 
in the long run, the attainment of this Hemispheric free trade area 
is envisaged by means of the subscription of free trade agreements 
with "groups of countries that have associated for purposes of 
trade liberalization." The first step in this process is the free 
trade agreement with Mexico. Third, those countries that "are not 
yet positioned to embrace a free trade agreement" are offered the 
possibility of entering into "bilateral framework agreements," in 
order to "help establish principles for bilateral cooperation on 
trade issues."
Given these ingredients, an observer concluded that this 
initiative "is potentially the most sweeping since the Alliance for 
Progress," although admittedly it contrasts with this precedent
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because, as emphasized by President Bush, this time it is proposed 
to "shift the focus," from aid to trade.
Another outstanding trait of the proposal is the challenge it 
represents for the Latin American and Caribbean countries, because 
different negotiating possibilities are left open to formalize 
trading relationships with the United States.
First of all, there is the least intense alternative of 
seeking the bilateral subscription of a "framework agreement" on 
trade issues. This sort of instrument apparently would be similar 
to the 1987 framework agreement that preceded the informal 
negotiations that were recently announced between Mexico and the 
United States (WDW/17/90). In a way, this bilateral alternative 
would be similar to the experience of the thirties, when as a 
result of the breakdown of the multilateral trading system, trade 
relations between Latin America and the United States were 
regulated by what were known at the time as "reciprocal trade 
agreements," negotiated separately with each country.
Second, there is the alternative envisaged by the proposal of 
seeking to negotiate free trade agreements with groups of 
countries, with Central America, the Caribbean and the Andean 
countries as the most likely candidates. Administration officials 
were immediately quoted as saying that this alternative would be 
preferred to the bilateral, "piecemeal" approach. Although it would 
not cover some important trading partners, such as Brazil, 
Argentina, or Chile.
Finally, left unmentioned, perhaps the most potentially 
enticing alternative was suggested immediately afterwards by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Domingo Cavallo. He 
revealed that consultations would be held with the government of 
Brazil about the possibility of adopting a position by both 
governments that would serve as the basis for a common South 
American position. Admittedly, this is the least realistic of the 
negotiating options, particularly if it is pondered against recent 
experiences of scarce Latin American solidarity on other pressing 
issues, such as the external debt. Nonetheless, it should be 
recalled that in the debt negotiations, the strategy sponsored by 
the creditors was based on the case by case principle.
Be it as it may, the least that can be said about President 
Bush's initiative is that it has set the trade agenda with Latin 
America and the Caribbean for the 1990's.
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V. 4. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
(WDW/24/90 - 12 SEPTEMBER 1990)
It is indicative of where are the most hopeful sources of
external finance for Latin America in the nineties, that the
Institute of International Finance (IIF) has published a study 
entitled Fostering Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America (July 
1990).
Established in 1983, the IIF groups more than 200
international commercial banks with the mandate of keeping its 
members informed. This original mandate was later expanded to 
include liaison and advocacy roles, such as "the formulation of 
long-term constructive solutions to the debt problem while 
expanding its base of cooperation and liaison with key
international organizations, national authorities and regulators, 
and government policy makers."
Persuaded that "the promotion of direct foreign investment, or 
investment associated with foreign ownership and management 
control, must be a major ingredient in any strategy to rekindle 
sustained economic development in Latin America," the IIF focuses 
on the factors affecting such investment, the main policy issues 
that have to be addressed to promote investment flows, as well as 
the short term outlook.
Submerged in the text, but essential to the IIF's analysis, is 
the dismissal of the apprehension recently voiced in Latin America 
about the potential diversion of capital flows to Central and 
Eastern Europe. The argument is that "because overall capital flows 
to Latin America have been less than 1 percent of gross flows in 
worldwide capital markets, it is difficult to sustain the argument 
that there is likely to be substantial diversion of private 
investment away from the region."
Within this context, the recent evolution of direct foreign 
investment in ten major Latin American countries — Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela—  is compared with five Asian countries — Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—  as well as with two 
Iberian countries — Portugal and Spain.
This comparison reveals a Latin American performance that is 
judged "disappointing." For instance, between 1984 and 1989, direct 
foreign investment in Latin America represented less than 1 percent 
of GDP, averaging only 0.7 percent, while in the Asian and Iberian 
countries mentioned, during the same period, this indicator was 
twice as large. Moreover, in 1989, foreign direct investment as a 
proportion of GDP declined in Latin America.
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There are differences among the Latin American countries in 
their capacity to attract foreign investment. Chile is 
individualized as the most successful, as well as others that have 
used debt-equity swaps, such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
By sector, the bulk of foreign investment in Latin America is 
concentrated in manufacturing, because of the restrictions that are 
found on investments in mining, petroleum and services, 
particularly in the financial sector. Furthermore, reinvestment of 
retained earnings accounted, in 1989, for 34 percent of all foreign 
investment in the ten Latin American countries mentioned.
By source, the United States is by far the largest, exceeding 
fifty percent of all foreign investment and heavily concentrated in 
manufacturing activities, such as chemicals, transportation 
equipment and machinery.
Among the factors affecting foreign investment flows, high 
transfer, or convertibility risk is identified as the main culprit. 
Also, rates of return on investment are lower in Latin America, 
despite recent increases, from 6.6 percent in 1984 to 12.5 percent 
in 1989, than in all other developing countries where they varied 
annually between 13.2 and 24.9 percent during 1984-1988.
Several factors are singled out to explain the lower returns 
on foreign direct investment in Latin America. Among them, falling 
overall output and income is said to be "perhaps the most 
important." Variables such as a higher rate of return and a 
stronger export performance, as well as debt-for-equity swap 
programs, are found to correlate positively with foreign direct 
investment, while interest arrears are found to be negatively 
correlated.
Economic policies by the host government are said to have a 
"critical effect" on foreign investment, with the fight against 
inflation, to generate a "stable business environment," identified 
as "the most pressing task of economic policymakers in most Latin 
American countries." More directly, the lifting of restrictions on 
foreign ownership and management control, as well as of regulations 
of profit and capital remittances are individualized as another 
priority for economic policy.
Finally, investment can also be an indirect way of gaining 
access to loan capital. Both are seen as complements, because 
parent companies can borrow in international capital markets, to 
finance the activities of their subsidiaries in Latin America.
To conclude, regarding the outlook, the IIF projects "an 
upturn in foreign direct investment in the region in 1990 and 1991 
from the depressed level of 1989." Moreover, it expects that "such 
investment would exceed the earlier peak registered in 1988." Also, 
if the major economies of Latin America "achieve inflation
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control," it is anticipated that the share of foreign investment in 
domestic capital formation will "reach 10 percent in 1993, double 
the average of the last five years." This "projected upswing" is 
seen as resulting from "the outlook for improved economic 
policies," as well as from "extensive use of debt-for-equity swaps 
in privatizations in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico."
V. 5. DEBT AND INVESTMENT IN THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS 
(WDW/30/90 - 24 OCTOBER 1990)
Almost eclipsed by the news from the Persian Gulf and the 
debate over the budget deficit, on September 14, President Bush 
submitted to Congress a legislative proposal to implement the 
investment and debt elements of the Enterprise for the Americas 
(WDW/19/90) . In a ceremony held at the White House, in the presence 
of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the President of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), President Bush said the legislative proposal "advances both 
the investment and debt portions of the initiative and contains an 
innovative approach to the environment."
The basic purpose of the proposal is "to encourage and support 
market-oriented reform and economic growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean," by means of: 1) contributions to an investment fund 
administered by the IDB; 2) support for an investment sector 
lending program at the IDB, in support of investment reforms; 3) 
the creation of a facility at the U.S. Treasury Department to 
support debt reduction operations; 4) the reduction of official 
debts and the use of interest payments on reduced obligations to 
support environmental programs; and 5) the sale, reduction or 
cancellation of certain assets and loans to facilitate debt/equity 
or debt-for-nature swaps.
The investment fund is expected to be multilateral, it will be 
administered by the IDB and can commence operations based initially 
on the U.S. contribution. Also, as discussed during the Houston 
Summit (WDW/21/90), contributions to the Fund will be sought by 
the U.S. Treasury from European countries, Japan and Canada, until 
the goal of US $1.5 billion is reached.
For this purpose, the U.S. government is seeking legislative 
authorization to contribute US $100 million annually, over five 
years, beginning in FY 1992. The purpose of the fund is to provide 
grants to support investment policy initiatives and reforms, as 
well as technical assistance for privatization, development of 
business infrastructure, and worker training and education 
programs.
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The IDB will also establish a sector lending program to 
provide support for investment reforms, through the liberalization 
of investment regimes, as a means to attract scarce capital and the 
reflow of flight capital.
The Enterprise for the Americas facility at the Department of 
the Treasury will support market oriented and investment reforms, 
as well as environmental protection, by administering debt 
reduction operations for eligible countries. *
Latin American and Caribbean countries will be eligible for 
debt reduction operations administered by the facility if they 
have: 1) IMF or World Bank economic programs; 2) an IDB loan to 
support major investment reforms or otherwise implement an open 
investment regime; and 3) a negotiated financing program with 
commercial banks.
For the reduction of concessional debts, of the Agency for 
international Development (AID) and P.L. 480, the Secretary of the 
Treasury will chair an interagency procedure for the exchange of 
outstanding obligations for new, reduced obligations bearing 
concessional interest rates. Also, Eximbank loans and credit 
guarantees from the Commodity Credit Corporation can be reduced, 
sold or canceled to facilitate debt/equity swaps or debt-for-nature 
swaps.
The proposal also contains an environmental component. Each 
country eligible for debt reduction will negotiate an environmental 
agreement with the United States that will allow interest payments 
in local currency of reduced obligations. The agreement will 
establish an Environmental Fund owned by the debtor country, to 
receive the interest payments, as well as to determine the use of 
these resources, through the provision of grants for environmental 
projects and programs. A local committee, composed of eligible 
country representatives, as well as U.S. Government and local 
private environmental group representatives, will be charged with 
the formulation of such programs and projects.
Finally, on 31 December of each year, the President will 
transmit to the U.S. Congress an annual report on the operations of 
the Enterprise for the Americas facility. %
Several conclusions can be derived from this brief 
description of the debt and investment components of the Enterprise *
for the Americas. First, the leading role that the U.S. Treasury 
Department is performing in the implementation of the initiative.
Second, the decisive role granted to the IDB in both the debt and 
investment components. Third, the emphasis on the environment and 
the role given to private environmental organizations. Fourth, by 
contrast, the commercial aspects of the Enterprise for the Americas
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seem to be lagging behind, since there still does not seem to exist 
a comparably clear definition of these aspects, and there are has 
not yet clearly emerged a leading agency to implement them.
On trade, in the presentation at the White House of the 
legislative proposal, President Bush recalled that the "long-term 
objective" was "a hemispheric free trade zone from Alaska to 
Argentina." He mentioned "as a step in that direction," that the 
immediate objective was "to negotiate framework agreements" and he 
also recalled that such agreements had already been signed with 
Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, as well as that others were 
in progress.
V. 6. PROGRESS REPORT ON THE U.S.-MEXICO TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
(WDW/32/90 - 7 NOVEMBER 1990)
On September 25, in response to a letter from Mexican 
President Salinas, dated August 21, proposing formally the 
negotiation of a free-trade agreement between the United States and 
Mexico, President Bush notified to the U.S. Congress the initiation 
of such negotiations. In the same notification, President Bush also 
informed the Congress about the desire recently expressed by the 
Government of Canada "to participate in the negotiations, with a 
view to negotiating an agreement or agreements among all three 
countries."
The Administration's request started the clock by which the 
Congress has sixty legislative days, or at least four months, to 
determine if such an agreement conforms to U.S. interests. If it is 
so determined, President Bush would be granted "fast track 
authorization," giving the USTR full negotiating powers. The 
Congress is left with the possibility of voting only up or down, 
without making any changes in the agreement thus negotiated.
Two days after the presentation of President Bush's request, 
on September 27, both the Senate and House Committees requested 
jointly from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) the 
preparation of a detailed study on the potential impact of the free 
trade agreement. The study is due in February or March, to serve as 
the basis for the decision that Congress will have to make sometime 
in April of next year. Covering twenty specific industrial sectors, 
such as automobiles, electronics and textiles, the study will also 
try to measure the potential impact on specific regions, including 
the U.S.-Mexico border to be considered as a single geographic 
unit.
The announcement of the request came as a surprise to many, 
particularly those that expected that the negotiations with Mexico
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would wait for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This was the 
impression left after President Salinas' visit to Washington in 
June (WDW/17/90). The final communique instructed the appointed 
negotiators, USTR Ambassador Carla Hills and Mexico's Secretary of 
Commerce and Industrial Development, Dr. Jaime Serra Puche, to 
report back to the Presidents "as soon as practicable, but in any 
event before their next meeting," to be held in Monterrey, Mexico, 
next December.
When it was leaked, in early August, that the request for 
fast-track authorization would be sent to Congress in September, 
Ambassador Carla Hills made it very clear that formal negotiations 
with Mexico could not begin until next year, when the Congress 
would grant the negotiating authority. Consequently, she said, this 
was no distraction from the Administration's highest trade priority 
for 1990, namely, the successful completion of the Uruguay Round in 
December.
Two explanations were offered about the timing of the request 
to Congress. The New York Times, citing "Administration officials" 
linked the decision to the Persian Gulf crisis. Although described 
as "not the only reason," The Times said "the Middle East crisis 
has focused the world's attention on global oil supplies. Mexico, 
with the eighth-largest reserves in the world, would be likely to 
attract more outside capital with a trade pact to help tap those 
reserves."
The Wall Street Journal attributed the speed-up of the 
decision to a victory by "the Texans in the Bush Administration," 
in what it described as "the behind-the-scenes struggle to give 
Mexico a prominent place on the nation's agenda."
According to The Journal this marked a defeat for those who 
"argued that early negotiations with Mexico could interfere with 
efforts next year to win congressional support for a new global 
trade agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."
Among "the Texans" The Journal found Secretary of State James 
Baker and Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher, who "argued 
vigorously that a free-trade pact with Mexico should be a top 
priority for the Administration." Both, reportedly, "also got an 
assist from another Texan, Democratic Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, who 
helped persuade the key members of Congress to support the talks."
In the opposition appear Ambassador Carla Hills and Secretary 
of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter, assisted by Labor Secretary 
Elizabeth Dole, who reportedly "expressed the reservations of 
organized labor to the U.S.-Mexico pact.”
Meanwhile, in what The Washington Post called "a rare display 
of official cooperation in a politically touchy area," the U.S. and 
Mexican commerce ministers, on October 22, undertook a journey
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across the United States to explain to business and civic leaders 
the advantages of greater U.S investment in Mexico. In the terms of 
Secretary Mosbacher, "we are going to be selling the advantages of 
a free-trade agreement that makes both countries more competitive," 
in Houston, Dallas, New York, Chicago and Los Angeles.
Finally, limiting the negotiations, Mexico's trade negotiator, 
Mr. Herminio Blanco, told a meeting at the Overseas Development 
Council (ODC) , in Washington on October 25, "this will be an 
agreement on trade issues," excluding other more controverted 
matters, such as labor rights, drug controls, immigration, the 
environment and energy. The USTR's director of Mexican affairs, Mr. 
Robert Fischer agreed, because their inclusion could "kill the 
trade deal," turning it into "a Christmas tree."
V. 7. THE NEW CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE fCBI 1 1 \  
(WDW/33/90 - 14 NOVEMBER 1990)
After a long legislative ordeal, that started in August 1987, 
President Bush signed into law, on 20 August 1990, the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act (CBERA), better known as CBI 
II. As far as the list of products eligible for duty-free treatment 
is concerned, the new legislation does not contain any major 
breakthroughs. Even so, several changes were introduced that may 
have some impact on the trade and investment flows between the 
designated beneficiary countries and the United States. As Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen (D-TEX) declared, "better to pass a narrow bill than 
to see a more ambitious version defeated."
Total United States imports from the 28 CBERA beneficiary 
countries climbed from the previous year by 10 percent, to $6.6 
billion in 1989. Even so, after six years of operation of the 
CBERA, this figure represented a decrease from the $8.6 billion 
imported by the United States from these countries in 1984. In all, 
the share of imports from the CBERA countries in U.S. imports has 
been declining, from 2.7 percent in 1984 to 1.4 percent in 1989.
By contrast, U.S. exports to the CBERA countries have 
increased, from $5.9 billion in 1984 to $8.1 billion in 1989, 
although their share in total U.S. exports has declined, from 2.8 
percent in 1984 to 2.3 percent in 1989.
Duty free imports under the CBERA amounted to $906 million in 
1989, a 15 percent increase over the $791 million attained in 1988, 
representing nearly 14 percent of total imports from beneficiary 
countries. In 1984, the first year of CBERA operation, duty free 
imports accounted for 7 percent of total imports from beneficiary 
countries.
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For the third consecutive year, in 1989, the United States 
registered a surplus with CBERA beneficiary countries amounting to 
$1.5 billion, due mainly to an increase in exports of 8 percent 
over the 1988 level. Beef remained the leading CBERA duty-free 
import, amounting to $118.5 million in 1989, with Costa Rica as the 
principal supplier of $25.2 million. Raw cane sugar followed, 
amounting to $106.4 million in 1989, with more than two thirds, or 
$72.7 million, supplied by the Dominican Republic.
Out of the $906 million of total customs value of U.S.-CBERA 
duty-free imports, only 37 percent, or $331 million, were granted 
duty-free entry, or only 5 percent of the customs value of total 
imports from CBERA beneficiaries.
Overall investment figures in beneficiary countries reveal 
that in 1989 there were 316 new or expansion investment projects, 
out of which 263 projects amounted to $406 million. By subregions, 
in 1989, the Central Caribbean reported the highest amount of new 
investment, with $170 million, while Central America and the 
Eastern Caribbean reported $116 million and $112 million, 
respectively.
Finally, according to the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(ITC), "the estimated net welfare cost to the United States of 
granting duty-free treatment to the 30 leading items that actually 
benefitted from CBERA ranged from $2.4 million to $8.2 million in
1989." The concept of net welfare costs used by the ITC is based on 
the "foregone benefits to U.S. producers and the U.S. Treasury 
minus the gain to U.S. consumers."
These results served as background to the recent approval of 
CBI II, whose lengthy and frustrating legislative ordeal is in 
stark contrast with the small magnitudes of trade flows and the 
products involved. Originally, several important modifications were 
proposed to the existent legislation, such as guaranteed sugar 
quotas or increased market access for textiles and leather goods, 
but these were deleted or disappeared as a result of legislative 
negotiations.
Even so, certain innovations survived, among which the repeal 
of the 30 September 1995 termination date for the CBI, made the 
program permanent. Second, a reduction of 20 percent in the tariffs 
of certain leather products, except footwear, such as flat goods, 
leather apparel and work gloves, phased over five years with no 
more than a 2.5 percentage point reduction permitted on any one 
product. Third, articles produced in Puerto Rico and sent to be 
processed in a CBI country, if the materials added are of CBI or 
U.S. origin, can return to the U.S. duty free. Fourth, the most 
important new provision allows for duty and quota-free entry for 
products assembled or processed of components of the United States 
and it eliminates the 35 percent value added criteria. Fifth, other 
provisions require Puerto Rico to ensure that at least $100 million
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of section 936 funds, derived from tax preferences granted to U.S. 
firms to encourage reinvestment of profits, are invested during 
each calendar year after 1989 in qualified CBI countries. Finally, 
Nicaragua was designated as beneficiary country and workers rights 
criteria were harmonized with GSP standards.
In addition to these legislative changes, on 1 November 1990, 
President Bush approved a package of measures designed to improve 
the operation of the CBI in trade, investment and tourism, as well 
as in promotion and marketing and in the provision of technical 
assistance. This implicitly recognizes that the performance of the 
CBI remains behind expectations, as demonstrated by the unbalanced 
trade flows, as by the rates of utilization of CBERA benefits, 
which have gone from 31.3 percent in 1985 to 46.5 percent in 1989.
VI. FINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE
VI. 1. THE AMOUNT OF THIRD WORLD INDEBTEDNESS 
(WDW/2/90 - 24 JANUARY 1990)
This year's World Debt Tables are presented in two volumes. 
The first volume of Analysis and Summary Tables contains a very 
accurate and complete, "blow-by-blow," description of what is 
termed "the implementation of debt reduction," as well as summary 
debt data tables for all the reporting countries, grouped 
geographically and according to income indicators. The second 
volume of Country Tables contains statistics for each one of the 
111 countries that report public and publicly guaranteed debt to 
the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS).
Twelve Latin American and Caribbean countries appear 
prominently among the group of nineteen severely indebted middle- 
income countries (SIMICs). The only exception is Guyana, that 
appears among the group of twenty seven severely indebted low- 
income countries (SILICs), as well as the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Jamaica and Paraguay, that appear among the group of 
sixteen moderately indebted middle-income countries (MIMICs).
Here are some of the highlights contained in the first volume:
1) Total external debt owed by developing countries in 1989 
increased $0.6 billion, or 5 percent, to reach $1,290 billion, or 
about 44 percent of their aggregate GDP. Also, preliminary 
projections for 1990 indicate that total debt is expected to grow 
at a rate of about 2 percent.
68
2) Total external debt owed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 1989 increased to $434 billion, from $427.4 billion in 1988, or 
about 50.9 percent of GNP and 297 percent of total exports of goods 
and services.
3) In 1989, official creditors accounted for an estimated 48 
percent of the long-term external debt of developing countries, 
compared with 38 percent in 1982. By contrast, net commercial 
lending is expected to be slightly negative, since repayments * 
exceeded disbursements.
4) Compared to 1988, the pace of debt reduction slowed mainly 
because of a decline in debt-equity swaps and because the new debt 
strategy had not yet been applied.
5) Thus, the face value of total 1989 debt reduction, 
including voluntary transactions with commercial banks, amounted to 
an estimated $14 billion, compared with $33 billion in 1988.
6) The appreciation of the dollar, against some of the major 
currencies in 1989, continued to curb the rise in the stock of 
dollar-denominated debt, by lowering the value of non-dollar debt 
obligations.
7) Net lending to developing countries increased in 1989, with 
disbursements of long-term loans amounting to $99 billion, compared 
with $95.7 billion in 1988.
8) Net flows (disbursements less principal repayments) 
amounted in 1989 to $25.6 billion, compared with $20.3 billion in
1988.
9) Higher interest payments offset the increase in net flows 
and led to net transfers (net flows minus interest payments) from 
developing countries of $52 billion, amount almost similar to the 
previous year.
10) A more comprehensive measure of financing flows is 
proposed in the form of aggregate net resource transfers—  defined 
as net foreign direct investment, net unrequited transfers 
(including official grants), net lending from private and official 
sources, and the change in arrears less interest and dividend 
payments. In these terms, in 1988, net resource transfers from 
developing countries to their creditors amounted to $9.8 billion.
Beyond the rich descriptive data, the World Bank draws some 
interesting conclusions about the implementation of the new debt 
strategy, particularly concerning the severely indebted middle- 
income countries.
Even when it is considered "still too early to judge its 
eventual success," several questions are raised about the new
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strategy, as it applies to the SIMICs. For instance, the amounts 
available for credit enhancement from official sources do not allow 
for much hope about the extent of debt service reduction. Moreover, 
while a significant rise in official resources is seen as "highly 
unlikely," the commercial banks "appear to have very little 
incentive for or interest in lending to developing countries in 
general and to SIMICs in particular." Furthermore, there are 
questions about the contribution that can be made by bank advisory 
committees, given "the wide divergence in commercial bank 
positions." Finally, several commercial banks are reluctant to 
support debt and debt service reduction for fear that it will 
"contaminate" their portfolios, although it is recognized that no 
debtors, until now, have "deliberately attempted to reduce the 
market price of their debt."
Additionally, for the new debt strategy to work as intended, 
the Bank identifies some decisive factors, such as a favorable 
external environment for debtor countries; growing debt 
inflexibility, due to conversions and buybacks exempt from future 
restructuring, "leaves little room for future policy slippages by 
debtor countries;" debt reduction packages should include different 
elements, such as new money, to appeal to different banks; tax 
authorities and regulators can determine the degree of 
participation of commercial banks in debt reduction packages; 
sufficient external finance should be available in the event of 
adverse external shocks; an equitable framework of burden sharing 
among creditors should be put in place; finally, the present debt 
strategy does not address the problems of SIMICs that owe their 
debt mainly to bilateral official creditors.
The preceding, very brief summary reveals that in this year's 
Debt Tables a more active stance is adopted, by frankly enumerating 
some of the limitations exhibited by the prevailing debt strategy. 
No longer the solution, as in the 1986 TABLES, is a "common good," 
that cannot be expected to come from the market "left to itself." 
Neither is it only, as in the 1987 TABLES, a problem whose "costs" 
have been "borne largely by the debtors." Nor should debt reduction 
be adopted to avoid the political dangers of "radicalization," as 
in the 1988 Tables. This year, the World Bank sets aside these 
"analytical" perspectives, by adopting the position of an active 
participant, perhaps because of its increasing exposure.
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VI. 2. FINANCIAL MARKET GLOBALIZATION AND VOLATILITY 
(WDW/18/90 - 27 June 1990)
The U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, in 
recent testimony to the Financial Institutions Supervision, 
Regulation and Insurance Subcommittee, of the House Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, described some of the factors 
leading to "globalization and interdependence," which he 
characterized as "the dominant elements of world finance."
For instance, one of the main factors underlying the present 
globalization of financial markets can be found in the dramatic 
increases in the amount and velocity of money and financial capital 
flows. In the terms of the FED Vice-Chairman, Manuel Johnson,
financial flows "now drive trade flows rather than the other way
around."
For instance, in 1989, foreign purchases and sales of U.S. 
Treasury securities surpassed $4 trillion on a gross basis, a 
figure that contrasts starkly with the $3 trillion attained by 
world merchandise trade in the same year. This figure is all the 
more impressive when it is considered that foreign purchases of 
U.S. Treasury securities, at the beginning of the eighties, 
oscillated between $100 and $200 million.
Underlying these spectacular increases in the amount and 
velocity of financial flows, another key factor identified by 
Chairman Greenspan were the "quantum advances in technology," that 
have led to an explosive growth in information-gathering and 
processing techniques. "Computer and telecommunications 
technology," according to Chairman Greenspan, are "boosting gross 
financial transactions across national borders at an even faster 
pace than the net transactions supporting the increase in goods and 
services." Moreover, given the role of the dollar as the key
international currency, such flows have been and "may continue to 
be, disproportionately into assets denominated in the dollar."
Another factor is the world-wide trend towards financial 
market deregulation, as well as the consequent proliferation of 
financial instruments, the unbundling of financial risk leading to 
increasingly specialized risk management, by means of new
opportunities for arbitrage and hedging around domestic 
regulations, controls and taxes, all of them undermining domestic 
policies.
There seems to be agreement that the globalization of 
financial markets has generated many benefits through increased
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competition, expanding the choices for savers and investors, 
reducing the costs of intermediation, and improving the allocation 
of saving and investment nationally and internationally.
Even so, as characterized by the President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Gerald Corrigan, the trend towards 
globalization has also become "a two-edged sword." Because the same 
* forces that are pushing towards globalization "have also increased
► volatility in financial markets, introduced new and highly complex 
elements of risk — possibly even increasing systemic risk."
Underlying these trends are the dramatic changes experienced 
by the patterns of international savings flows. As summarized by 
President Corrigan, during the eighties, "Germany and Japan emerged 
as massive surplus nations; the newly industrial countries in Asia 
emerged as major forces in world trade and finance; the net savings 
flows into the developing world slowed to a trickle; and, the U.S. 
net external position deteriorated in a major and almost 
unimaginable manner."
Quantitatively, these trends have meant, for instance, that 
the U.S. current account deficit of $100 billion, in 1989, 
"represented the equivalent of almost ten percent of the net 
savings of Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany combined."
Given the pivotal role played by the United States in all 
these impressive changes, two characteristics of the U.S. banking 
and financial system, identified recently by President Gerald 
Corrigan, may also be contributing to the volatility of the present 
international system.
First of all, the U.S. financial system has witnessed, in 
recent years, "a disproportionate number of financial disruptions." 
And second, the banking system of the United States has been 
experiencing a slippage in competitive performance, both 
domestically and internationally.
Five major factors were recently identified by President 
Corrigan to explain this dual condition of instability and 
competitive slippage in the U.S. banking and financial system.
First, U.S. macroeconomic performance and policies, such as
► volatility in GNP and inflation, low savings and a weakened
external position, contrast with Japan's strong overall economic 
and financial performance.
Second, "the historic value of the banking franchise is under 
great pressure" in the United States, to the point that "the most 
creditworthy corporate borrowers can now fully bypass the entire 
banking and financial system for many of their day-to-day credit 
needs."
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Third, as a result of "the competitive implications of the 
technological and market forces described above," in the United 
States, there is "excess capacity in large segments of banking and 
finance." Such a situation "seems, at times, to create a vested 
interest in volatility," that "reinforces the unrelenting 
preoccupation with the short run."
Fourth, the legal and institutional framework within which 
U.S. banking and financial institutions operate is "outdated," to 
the point that the banking system is considered "simply out of step 
with the rest of the world and, more importantly, it is out of step 
with the realities of the marketplace." Moreover, fragmentation 
makes the U.S. banking system "risk and accident prone," due to an 
inhibition of the "diversification of risks."
Finally, in the U.S. there is a "relatively high incidence of 
financial disruptions," due to "gaps or lapses in the supervisory 
process." The most recent example is the savings and loans 
collapse, a situation characterized by President Corrigan as "far 
more a fatal flaw in the legal and supervisory process than it was 
in the architecture of the deposit insurance system."
In conclusion, some time ago, Charles Kindleberger explained 
the Great Depression because of the absence of a leading country 
willing and able to assume the role of "stabilizer." No wonder, the 
trend towards the globalization of financial markets, as well as 
the characteristics of the banking and financial system of the 
United States, both generating unprecedented degrees of volatility 
also raise ominous questions about the health of the overall 
international economic system.
VI. 3. ADJUSTMENT LENDING REVISITED (WDW/29/90 - 17 OCTOBER 1990)
Almost a year after the World Bank undertook a thorough 
evaluation of adjustment lending, its Country Economics Department 
has revisited the subject and gathered its main findings in a 
document released in September for an internal discussion.
This new evaluation tries to respond to some of the issues 
identified as demanding further analysis when the Bank's Board of 
Directors discussed the first evaluation. Some of these were: the 
sustainability of growth effects? the impact of external factors on 
economic performance; the impact of adjustment on poverty and 
living conditions? the role of the debt overhang? the experience 
with the design and implementation of programs? the need for 
increased dialogue among aid-giving agencies; the importance of
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political and institutional realities; and the policies needed in 
adjustment programs to increase investment, saving and growth in 
the adjusting countries.
To respond to some of these concerns, the most recent 
evaluation is divided in two parts: first, a review of the Bank 
experience with adjustment lending contains chapters on the 
effectiveness of adjustment programs; the impact of structural 
adjustment on living conditions; the design and implementation of 
adjustment programs; and on adjustment lending and Bank exposure. 
The second part analyzes how to restore growth and contains 
chapters on investment, saving and on the determinants of growth.
The report's main conclusions can be summarized under the 
following headings:
1) On the aggregate effects of structural reforms, those 
countries that have adopted adjustment programs have on average 
grown faster than other countries, as measured by larger increases 
in the average rate of GDP growth.
2) On average, in those countries with better growth 
performances, investment fell as a share of GDP. Even after 
explicitly controlling for other factors, such as external shocks, 
external financing, initial conditions and determinants of the 
demand for adjustment programs, adjustment lending usually 
increased the ratios of domestic saving and exports to GDP, but 
reduced the average ratio of investment to GDP.
3) Adjustment programs are more likely to fail when a stable 
macroeconomic framework is not in place, even when the adjustment 
package focuses mainly on microeconomic or sectoral policies.
4) On the effects on poverty and living conditions, the report 
finds no evidence that adjustment lending caused an increase in the 
overall misery of the poor. Orderly adjustment, supported by Bank 
lending, is found to be less costly for most of the poor and for 
the general populace than disorderly adjustment without Bank 
support. No systematic relationship is found between changes in the 
available socioeconomic indicators of living conditions and 
adjustment lending. Short-run indicators, such as current 
consumption, nutrition and immunization have improved, as well as 
long-run indicators of living conditions, such as infant and child 
mortality. Even so, the share of central government expenditure on 
the social sector has fallen, as have declined per capita social 
expenditures by the central government. For instance, declines in 
education expenditure have been accompanied by falling primary 
school enrollment ratios.
5) To prevent declines in socioeconomic indicators, the Report 
proposes to increase social sector expenditures targeted toward the 
poor. The main constraint faced by these "targeted interventions" 
is found not in their fiscal cost, but rather in the degree of 
commitment by the government to assist the poor, as well as in the 
institutional capacity to reach the poor.
6) Increases in the efficiency of investment, through the 
abolition of a critical mass of distortions, rather than minor 
decreases in extremely high distortions, can reduce the need for 
more saving.
7) To sustain adjustment and restore growth, there must be an 
increase in investment, which demands macroeconomic stability, 
removing legal and bureaucratic impediments, expanding public 
investment, and ensuring sufficient external financing.
8) Saving rates have to increase to sustain desirable rates of 
investment and initially the most effective way is to increase 
public saving.
9) Other refinements refer to the sequencing of reforms, with 
the restoration of macroeconomic balances placed at the top, 
whenever high inflation and large current account deficits are 
present. Also, sequencing must take into account linkages among 
sectors.
10) Finally, more attention needs to be given to reforming 
and developing institutions, particularly to the strengthening of 
public institutions, despite the reduction in resources going to 
the public sector.
To conclude, the timeliness of the report should be 
considered, because the relative importance of adjustment lending 
is decreasing as a percentage of total Bank operations. According 
to the last Annual Report (WDW/26/90), during FY90, adjustment 
lending represented only 19 percent of all Bank commitments, by 
contrast with FY89, when they amounted to 30 percent of all 
commitments. Unfortunately, the report uses figures that go up to 
the end of CY89, revealing that "adjustment lending as a share of 
total approvals rose, by value, from 25 percent in CY88 to 27 
percent in CY89."
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VII. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
VII. 1. RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD BANK 
(WDW/8/90 - 7 MARCH 1990)
During fiscal year 1989, expenditures on research activities 
at the World Bank amounted to $20.2 million, of which $14.6 million 
covered 121.7 staff-years, up from 89.2 staff-years in FY 1988, and 
$5.5 million covered support activities. As in previous years, 
these expenditures absorbed roughly 3.9 percent of the Bank's 
administrative budget.
In a recently released yearly report on its research program, 
the Bank basically includes activities such as those performed by 
a "think tank," in the form of policy papers, as well as "academic 
research," that "addresses issues of fundamental concern to the 
institution and the development community at large."
Other analytical activities performed by the Bank are not 
covered by the report. These include economic and sector work 
(ESW), such as country analysis, as well as policy work, both in 
support of specific lending operations. As a percentage of overall 
analytical activities, in FY 1989, research represented almost 16 
percent, ESW almost 59 percent and policy work 25 percent.
Two major sources of funding are available to finance research 
activities at the Bank. First, the Research Support Budget, 
administered by the Research Committee, disbursed $5.6 million 
during FY 1989, compared with $5.1 million in the previous year, 
which added to the staff time dedicated to research projects 
amounted to $9.3 million, or 46 percent of all expenditures. 
Second, the resources from the different departments, mainly staff 
time, which amounted to $14.6 million, or 54 percent of overall 
research expenditures.
Substantive "special emphasis areas" absorbed almost 70 
percent of all research expenditures during FY 1989. The breakdown 
was: debt restructuring and adjustment (14.8 percent); human
resources (11.4 percent) poverty alleviation (10.8 percent); public 
sector management (10.6 percent); environment (7.2 percent); 
privatization (5 percent); food security (4.4 percent); financial 
intermediation (2.8 percent); women in development (2.5 percent); 
and coordination, publication and dissemination (6.5 percent).
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The recent restructuring undergone by the Bank set two basic 
goals for Bank's research, "the creation of a research portfolio 
that reflected new institutional priorities and to rebuild and 
diversify the Bank's centrally funded research program."
The list of substantive "special emphasis areas" reveals that 
the research portfolio addresses the major themes covered by Bank 
operations. This list of issues is subject to constant updating. 
For FY 1990, three current topics have been added as subjects of 
special emphasis: the environment, the development of the private 
sector, and the reform of the socialist economies. Certain regional 
issues will also receive increased research attention, such as Sub- 
Saharan Africa, as well as other international and domestic issues 
of particular concern for developing countries, such as the Uruguay 
Round, as well as technology change and comparative advantage.
The overall objective of becoming "an intellectual leader on 
development issues" is identified by President Conable in the 
memorandum presenting the report to the Executive Directors. To 
fulfill this objective, besides producing "technically sound 
research," the Bank also tries to communicate its research findings 
through a program of effective dissemination.
Additionally, "outreach" activities are carried out to link 
Bank researchers to development researchers and policymakers, 
through a Visiting Research Fellow Program and the Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics (ABODE).
In FY 1989, seven fellows visited the Bank for periods of 
three to six months and covered the following issues: macroeconomic 
policies and poverty alleviation in Latin America; problems of 
macroeconomic adjustment in centrally planned economies; transport 
and agriculture in Africa; global climatic change; project 
appraisal; and the indebtedness of developing countries.
In April 1989, the first ABCDE was held in Washington and 
participants discussed six major papers on the Uruguay Round, 
saving behavior in developing countries, social sector pricing 
policy, the role of institutions in development, the policy 
implications of "strategic" trade theories, and agricultural output 
response to public policy. The proceedings of the first conference 
have been recently issued as a book.
The second ABCDE has already been scheduled for April 1990, to 
discuss papers on environmental sustainability, the macroeconomics 
of transition from stabilization and adjustment to growth, 
experiences in evaluation of development projects and programs, as 
well as population and development.
The dissemination of the research program's results is 
described as a "perennial concern" and is carried out by means of 
the publication of two journals. The World Bank Economic Review
written by and for economists, with a circulation of over 9,000 
subscribers in developing countries and The World Bank Research 
Observer written to be accessible to the noneconomist and 
nonspecialist economist, with a circulation of 4,000 subscribers in 
developing countries.
The widely circulated monthly Finance and Development, 
published jointly with the IMF, also includes results of Bank 
research, as well as the quarterly newsletter Research News, that 
goes to more than 10,000 subscribers.
Finally, during the second half of 1990, a monthly Research 
Bulletin, will be launched "to ensure that all those interested in 
development economics are aware of this considerable output and to 
keep policymakers apprised of the cutting edge of Bank research."
VII. 2. THE WORLD BANK-IMF SPRING MEETINGS 
(WDW/14/90 - 23 MAY 1990)
This year's Bank-Fund spring meetings, held in Washington, 
from 4 to 8 May, were dominated by the IMF's Ninth General Review 
of Quotas. In the arcane language used in the solemn communiques 
issued at the end of each one of the meetings, other decisions were 
postponed because "further work" was still necessary.
As it can be recalled, the quota increase was long overdue. 
According to the IMF's Articles of Agreement (Art. Ill, Section 2) 
"a general review of members quotas shall be conducted by the Board 
of Governors at intervals of not more than five years." Since the 
Eighth General Review of Quotas was concluded on 31 March 1983, the 
Board of Governors was required to conduct the next review at the 
most by 31 March 1988.
To meet this deadline, according to rule D-3 of the Fund's 
Rules and Regulations, the Executive Board's Committee of the Whole 
was convened, on March 17, 1987, to work in the first instance on 
the quota review. Nonetheless, it was only after twenty Executive 
Board meetings and three postponements of the deadline — from the 
end of March 1988 to end-December 1989, then to end-March 1990, and 
further to June 30, 1990—  that consensus emerged among the main 
contributors.
Several factors were hindering the decision. First and 
foremost, the opposition expressed by the U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury, during last year's annual Bank-Fund meetings, in the 
sense that "a decision on quotas must be based on an agreed vision 
of the role of the Fund in the 1990s and on fundamental progress 
being made in resolving the arrears problem in order to strengthen
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the revolving, monetary character of the institution." This 
translated itself into a wide-ranging disagreement that went from 
the 100 percent increase proposed by the IMF's Managing Director, 
to the 35 percent increase supported by the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.
Second, there was the obstacle acknowledged by the Interim 
Committee's communique of the previous spring meeting, in the sense 
that "the size and distribution of any quota increase should take 
into account changes in the world economy since the last review of 
quotas, as well as members' relative positions in the world economy 
and the need to maintain a balance between different groups of 
countries." This had to do with the hierarchy of voting power, 
crucial in an institution ruled by weighted voting, determined 
according to each member's contribution. In this case, at issue was 
the position of Japan within the IMF's pecking order, ranking 
fifth, behind the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and 
France.
The final consensus announced in the Interim Committee's 
communique partially reveals the way in which some of these hurdles 
were vanquished.
First of all, on the amount, Secretary Brady announced that 
the United States had joined the consensus on increasing the quotas 
by fifty percent, from SDR 90 billion to SDR 135 billion, despite 
its original support for a smaller amount. On the next review of 
quotas, it was agreed that it should be conducted by 31 March 1993, 
instead of the maximum of five years allowed by the Articles of 
Agreement, the period originally sought by the United States. 
Finally, the Executive Board was "requested to prepare and complete 
for final decision" the quota increase, by 30 June 1990.
There was also agreement on how to deal with those countries 
that fall into arrears with the Fund. As proposed by the U.S. 
delegation, "as part of the overall quota increase package, no 
increase in quota shall become effective" before the entry into 
force of an amendment to the Articles of Agreement providing for 
the suspension of the voting rights of those members in arrears 
that persistently refuse to cooperate with the Fund.
Finally, on the pecking order, the result was that Japan will 
now share the number two position with West Germany, each one 
increasing their participation to slightly more than 6 percent. 
Also, the following position will be shared by Great Britain with 
France, by increasing their participation to 5.5 percent each. This 
arrangement was described by the West German Finance Minister, Mr. 
Theo Waigel, as "an Olympic solution," awarding "two silver and two 
bronze medals."
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No other issue commanded such attention during the meetings, 
neither were equivalent decisions attained on the rest of the items 
contained in the agendas of both the Interim and the Development 
Committees.
For instance, on the debt issue, the Development Committee 
"reaffirmed its support for the strengthened debt strategy as 
endorsed at its last meeting and welcomed the progress achieved so 
far."
On the establishment and funding of an environmental facility 
at the World Bank, the Development Committee concluded that 
"efforts should continue to develop proposals for a pilot 
mechanism."
Also, on increasing the resources of the International 
Financial Corporation (IFC), despite repeated clarion calls 
supporting the private sector, the Development Committee 
"encouraged the IFC's Executive Board to continue its discussion on 
the adequacy of the capital of the Corporation, including 
modalities of subscription."
Finally, a brief mention by the Group of Seven noted that 
"German monetary and economic union should contribute to higher 
global activity and a reduction of external imbalances," as well as 
it welcomed "the far-reaching market-oriented reforms pursued in 
some Eastern European countries." Although the G-7 "stressed that 
the attention given to Eastern European countries will not detract 
from the continued support for developing countries."
In conclusion, this year’s Bank-Fund spring meetings were 
almost exclusively dedicated to a single issue, the IMF's Ninth 
General Review of Quotas. To attain this long postponed decision, 
in the terms of Canada's Minister of Finance and Chairman of the 
Interim Committee, Mr. Michael Wilson, every main contributor "had 
to put a little water in its wine."
VII. 3. THE IMF'S ANNUAL REPORT (WDW/25/90 - 19 SEPTEMBER 1990)
The performance of the International Monetary Fund, during the 
financial year that ends on April 30, is reviewed by the Executive 
Board in the Annual Report released every year before the annual 
meetings of the Board of Governors.
The first part contains an overview of the world economy, 
based on the World Economic Outlook (WEO), originally released by 
the staff, in May 1990 (WDW/13/90) . The second part is dedicated to
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a review of the policies and activities of the Fund, under the 
following headings: surveillance; the external debt situation;
financial support to member countries; trade policy; and financial 
operations and policies.
Surveillance of the members' domestic and external policies 
takes the form of regular consultations and discussions on the 
world economic outlook. The present moderation in world economic 
activity is attributed in part to the implementation of monetary 
policies aimed at easing inflationary pressures. This concern in 
the industrialized countries over inflation, according to the 
Report does not warrant a relaxation of the cautious monetary 
stance, while there remains a need for the reduction of the 
external imbalances that persist.
The existence of constraints on external financing leads to 
the recommendation to developing countries of "sustaining sound 
domestic policies," while the heavily indebted countries are 
advised to "boost saving and investment, and adopt structural 
reforms."
Finally, the transition to market-oriented economies in 
Eastern Europe is said to be "likely to involve short-term 
adjustment costs" and demands "monetary and fiscal policies to 
foster a stable economic environment."
On the external debt situation, the Report welcomes the 
strengthening of the debt strategy and underlines the need for a 
flexible, case-by-case approach, with the Fund's financial 
assistance "catalyzing" lending and debt reduction from other 
sources. In these terms, the Report considers that "progress in 
implementing the strengthened debt strategy has been good" and as 
evidence in support of this assertion it mentions the agreements 
reached by Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela, as 
well as the tackling of the problems caused by the official debt of 
low-income countries.
The financial support granted by the Fund to member countries, 
during the financial year, amounted to SDR 11 billion, in the form 
of 26 new arrangements, the largest amount of the last six years.
Nine of these new arrangements were with the following countries of
the Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, *
Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
On trade policy, the REPORT asserts that "stronger efforts are 
urgently needed to counter protectionism," considering "essential 
to reach a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round."
■V
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The review of financial operations and policies reveals that: 
1) commitments of IMF resources increased markedly for the second 
year in a row, to SDR 11.3 billion, compared with SDR 4.6 billion 
and SDR 3.0 billion, respectively, in the previous two years. 2) 
Drawings (purchases) also increased, to SDR 4.4 billion. 3) 
Payments (repurchases) decreased only slightly to SDR 6.0 
billion. 4) The negative transfer of resources to the Fund 
decreased to SDR 1.6 billion, from SDR 4.0 billion in the previous 
year. 5) Overdue financial obligations increased to SDR 3.3 
billion, from SDR 2.9 billion. 6) Holdings of uncommitted and 
usable resources fell to SDR 41.2 billion, from SDR 42.9 billion at 
the end of the previous financial year. 7) Finally, for the 
performance of these activities the Fund employed 1,731 persons 
from 104 countries and its total administrative budget increased to 
SDR 185.7 million, from SDR 171.7 million the previous financial 
year.
In several respects, FY 1989/90 was "momentous" for the 
institution. For instance, as a result of the Ninth General Review, 
the Board of Governors agreed to expand the financial resources of 
the Fund by means of a 50 percent quota increase, to approximately 
SDR 135 billion.
Also remarkable was the support the Fund granted to what it 
termed "the unprecedented efforts of the Eastern European countries 
to restructure their economies." Thus, Hungary and Poland received 
financial and policy assistance from the Fund in their transition 
to a more market-oriented system, while Angola became a member and 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Mongolia applied for membership. 
Finally, Namibia and Switzerland submitted applications to become 
full members.
The overdue financial obligations to the Fund of some members 
increased to SDR 3.3 billion and continue posing "a serious 
problem." Nonetheless, some progress was registered in resolving 
such arrears, when the eligibility of Guyana and Honduras was 
restored in June 1990. Even so, nine members still were in arrears 
of six months or more, including Peru and Panama from the Western 
Hemisphere.
This brief overview of the activities performed by the Fund, 
during FY 1989/90, reveals a dynamic institution that is increasing 
its membership and that is playing a decisive catalytic role, at 
the center of most international financial rescue operations.
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VII. 4. THE WORLD BANK'S ANNUAL REPORT 
(WDW/26/90 - 26 SEPTEMBER 1990)
The 1990 Annual Report of the World Bank — covering the fiscal 
year from 1 July 1989 to 30 June 1990—  in seven sections 
describes: 1) the Executive Board's activities; 2) a global
perspective on the economic scene; 3) the Bank's operations; 4) the 
Bank's finances; 5) the Bank's activities, including those of the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); 6) regional
perspectives, including a segment dedicated to Latin America and 
the Caribbean; and 7) a summary of the projects approved during FY
1990.
Global economic performance is described by groups of 
countries and reveals the slowness registered in the pace of 
development of the industrialized countries, as well as in the 
previously fast-growing Asian economies. By contrast, the severely 
indebted and the African countries are said to have fallen far 
short of growth elsewhere, especially in per capita terms. Thus, 
the Bank notes the persistence of "two-track development," whereby 
the performance of the economies of Latin America and Africa, in 
1989, lagged behind the performance of other regions.
This overview of the world economy also includes the 
fundamental changes that took place in Central Europe, as well as 
"some successes in debt and debt reduction operations," to which 
the Bank contributed, such as the agreements signed by Mexico, the 
Philippines, Costa Rica and Venezuela. Finally, the Report notes 
the continuation of the increase in international initiatives to 
address global environmental concerns.
During FY 1990, lending commitments by the Bank amounted to 
US$ 20.7 billion, of which $15.1 billion from the Bank and $5.5 
billion from the International Development Association (IDA). Thus, 
the level of Bank's commitments declined by $1.2 billion from the 
previous year's total, while IDA commitments increased by $588 
million, to register a record high. In FY 1990, net disbursements 
from the Bank increased to $5.7 billion, from $1.9 billion during 
FY 1989. IDA net disbursements increased $224 million, to a total 
of $3.6 billion. Also, overall net income decreased to $1,046 
billion, from $1,094 billion.
Several areas received "special operation emphases" within the 
Bank's lending activities, during FY 1990. First, specific
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initiatives were adopted for Sub-Saharan Africa and in Central 
Europe. Second, debt and adjustment were also emphasized, as the 
Bank participated actively in debt reduction operations within the 
Brady Plan. Net disbursements during FY90 to the group of twenty 
severely indebted, middle income countries reached $4.0 billion, an 
increase of almost 250 percent over the $1.6 billion for FY89.
* Thus, net transfers from the Bank to this group of countries became 
positive, amounting to $1.4 billion, by contrast with 1989, when
* net transfers were negative $911 million.
In all, adjustment lending represented only 19 percent of FY90 
commitments, by contrast with FY89 when these operations 
represented 30 percent of the total. Other areas that received 
special attention throughout the fiscal year were poverty 
reduction, women in development, the environment, private sector 
development and public sector management.
Finally, in the segment dedicated to Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the REPORT registers the persistence of what it calls 
"the region's disappointing overall growth," noting several 
exceptions, such as Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and some Caribbean 
islands. Also, the need for the restoration of fiscal discipline is 
individualized as the main priority of economic policy.
In FY90, Bank's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean 
can be summarized as follows: 1) lending increased by $123 million 
over the previous year to reach a total of forty-one operations 
amounting to $6.0 billion. 2) Gross disbursements reached $6.2 
billion, an increase of 79 percent over the $3.4 billion for FY89. 
This sharp increase was accounted, in large part, by the fast 
disbursements for debt-reduction operations in Mexico. In these 
terms, during the five-year period 1986-90, gross disbursements 
have totaled more than $21 billion, or an annual average of $4.3 
billion. 3) Almost 41 percent of Bank commitments in Latin America 
and the Caribbean adopted the form of nonproject and adjustment 
lending to support economic policy reforms aimed at consolidating 
macroeconomic stability, to assist in debt reduction programs 
within the Brady Plan, as well as to support privatization efforts.
4) Finally, the volume of cofinancing increased by almost 60 
percent, to $4.1 billion for 18 projects. This increase was largely 
the result of three Bank loans to Mexico, amounting to $875.5 
£ million, of which $1.7 billion was provided by export-credit
agencies and the association of the Inter-American Development Bank 
v (IDB) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan with IBRD lending in
several countries. The largest sources of bilateral official 
cofinancing and of export-credit financing for the region remained 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund and the Ex-Im Bank of Japan, 
respectively. Also, participation by the IDB in sector lending 
contributed to the substantial increase in the availability of 
cofinancing resources, with seven World Bank projects drawing 
cofinancing from the IDB for a total of $1.3 billion.
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To conclude, in the present fiscal year 1991, the World Bank 
expects to extend between $21 and $24 billion in loans to 
developing countries, of which between $16 and $18 billion from the 
Bank and $5.7 billion from IDA.
VII. 5. THE IMF-WORLD BANK ANNUAL MEETINGS 
(WDW/27/90 - 3 OCTOBER 1990)
Under the specter of the "third oil shock," this year's annual 
meetings of the Bank and the Fund were dominated by three issues: 
first, the impact of the oil price hike on the world economic 
outlook; second, the participation in the Bretton Woods 
institutions of what were known as the "centrally planned 
economies;" and third, the arrears of some of the most indebted 
middle-income countries.
The abruptness of the oil price increase led to the 
presentation of hastily revised projections. For instance, the 
IMF's assumption of oil prices below $30 immediately became 
optimistic, when prices soared beyond this threshold. Still, the 
dominant perception was that the overall effects for the 
industrialized economies would be moderate.
However, the Finance Ministers and the Central Bank Governors 
of the G-7 — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States—  noted that the rise in oil prices 
posed the double risk of inflation and of lower economic growth. 
Despite this recognition, the final statement by the G-7, as well 
as the communique of the G-10 — the seven plus the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland—  only recommended the adoption of 
"stability oriented monetary policies." This less direct wording 
was interpreted as resulting from a difference caused by the 
predilection of the U.S. Treasury for lower interest rates.
The plight of the developing countries was mentioned in the 
press communique released by the Development Committee, recognizing 
that some of them "were being affected adversely" by several 
factors, such as the events in the Middle East, the economic 
slowdown in some industrial countries, higher interest rates and 
the weakening of non-oil commodity prices.
Of all these issues, the increase in oil prices fractured the 
deliberations of the G-24 developing countries in two camps. On one 
side, the net oil importers led by India and Pakistan proposed the 
creation, as it was done in response to the first oil shock, of a 
special oil facility at the IMF, with the contributions of the oil 
exporters and the industrialized countries. On the other side, some
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of the oil exporters, such as Venezuela, Mexico, Iran and Trinidad 
and Tobago opposed the creation of such a facility, arguing that it 
could not be anticipated if oil prices would remain high. 
Consequently, they preferred the more flexible utilization of 
existing mechanisms. World Bank President Conable found the 
response between these two positions. He proposed that "a new pool 
* of financial aid" would have to be created, "if the crisis
 ̂ continues for a protracted period of time — that is, if the price
^ of oil stays up," and he defined "protracted" as an extension of
the crisis into 1991.
Without the Middle East crisis, the presence of what were 
formerly known as "centrally planned economies" would have easily 
been the major attraction of the meetings. The main issue 
confronting these economies has to do with the pace of transition, 
or the alternative between gradual vs. quick transition to a market 
system. Besides the admission of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria as 
members, the alternative between gradualism or swiftness was
poignantly illustrated by the presence, as "special guests" of an 
official Soviet delegation of five members, representing 
gradualism, and a private delegation of twelve persons promoting 
the "Shatalin 500 Day Plan."
Finally, the indebtedness of the middle-income, developing 
countries attracted some attention, although in no way comparable 
to the concerns about the oil price increase and the pace of 
transition in Central Europe.
The arrears of the indebted countries appeared briefly at the 
forefront, in large part, as a result of the pressure exercised by 
the Institute of International Finance (IIF), the powerful advocate 
of more than 200 commercial banks from all over the world.
In this year's letter addressed to the Chairmen of the Interim 
and Development Committees, the Managing Director of the IIF 
demanded that "the IMF and the World Bank need to make clear that 
they will not provide finance to countries until they have stopped 
adding to arrears and agreed with their creditors to a program to 
eliminate the arrears within a reasonable time frame."
In these terms, the IIF's letter, without identifying the 
i  culprits by name, constituted a general statement of the commercial
banks' interests, and as such it would have remained only a mere 
V expression of an advocate. What transformed it into almost a major
policy definition was the more concrete version of the same 
requirement that appeared in the final statement issued by the 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G-7. They emphasized 
that they "expect Brazil to resolve its arrears problems with its 
external creditors in the context of the adoption of a formal IMF 
arrangement."
At issue here was one of the major ingredients of the Brady 
Plan, the "decoupling" of the access to the international financial 
institutions from the simultaneous agreement with commercial 
creditors. After the G-7 statement nobody seems to know what should 
happen first. Every debtor will be closely watching the evolution 
in the next days of the Brazilian negotiation to see if both the 
agreement with the Fund and the agreement with the commercial banks 
will be attained simultaneously.
Finally, a note of optimism for Latin America took the form of 
the election of Chile's Minister of Finance, Mr. Alejandro Foxley 
Rioseco, as chairman of the Development Committee. This appointment 
gives hope that Latin American and Caribbean interests will be 
asserted at the right time and in the appropriate instances.
»
J.
*
*1
4
i
